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An important step in the Navy's Regional Maintenance Program is the 
consolidation of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and the Naval Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility to improve maintenance operations. Final approval to continue operation as a 
consolidated organization is scheduled for FY 2000. To gain approval, the Navy must 
demonstrate to the Office o{the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Congress that the 
consolidation has been successful in improving maintenance operations. This thesis 
evaluated five metrics proposed by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA) and the 
Naval Audit Service (NAS) to measure performance of the consolidation. The process of 
developing a strategic plan and a performance measurement system (PMS) was 
explained. The "Balanced Scorecard" framework was used to present the five metrics in 
a comprehensive PMS. The five proposed metrics, "cost per unit of output", "quality", 
"production efficiency and resource utilization", "CSMP backlog", and "schedule 
adherence", were evaluated as useful measures of performance. Ten additional metrics 
were developed that provide managers further evaluation tools to measure improvements 
in maintenance operations. Of the ten, only "total asset twnover", the "days worked 
ratio", and "revenue/cost per employee", are recommended for inclusion with the original 
five metrics for OSD and Congressional review. 
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1. Maintenance and the National Defense 
"The world remains a dangerous and highly uncertain place, and the United States 
likely will face a number of significant challenges to its security between now and 2015." 
This quote from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states very clearly the 
reason we must maintain a strong national defense. To keep the defense infrastructure in 
the state of readiness required by the world situation it must be properly maintained. 
Proper maintenance is vital to the operation of military hardware and systems that are 
increasingly complex. These systems, and the people who operate them, are the 
cornerstone of the defense of our country. 
A key piece of the maintenance puzzle is DOD Depot maintenance. This massive 
system employs about 76,000 DOD civilian personnel, controls facilities and equipment 
valued at over $50 billion, and is charged with maintaining 52,000 combat vehicles, 
514,000 wheeled vehicles, 17,300 aircraft of over 100 different models, and 347 ships 
[Ref 1]. This maintenance, however, comes with a big price tag. In FY98 nearly $14 
billion will be spent on depot maintenance of DOD hardware and systems. Of that the 
Navy will spend nearly $5.3 billion. The Ship Depot Maintenance (SDM) portion of that 
money amounts to $4.6 billion [Ref 2]. The majority of these funds will be spent in the 
four remaining naval shipyards (NSY): Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, Norfolk, and 
Portsmouth NSY. 
A recent report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that: [Ref 3] 
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• "The inefficient operation of depot maintenance activities results in a reduction 
in the military services purchasing power through its Operations and 
Maintenance funds." 
• For FY98, Naval shipyards could expect an end-of-year Navy Working Capital 
Fund (NWCF) accumulated operating result (AOR) of between -$25 and -
$100 million. This would continue a long-standing trend of losses in this most 
important of the Navy's business sectors. 
Clearly the time has come for strategically re-thinking the Navy's ship depot 
maintenance system to improve the operating results. 
It is imperative that defense managers ensure the limited funds for defense be 
invested as effectively as possible. In today's downsizing environment that imperative 
takes on even more importance. In the area of naval ship maintenance, value adding and 
non-value adding activities must be identified with the objective of enhancing the value 
received on the defense dollar. The result should be a leaner, more productive and cost-
effective maintenance organization. Savings in dollars are then available to upgrade the 
capabilities of our fighting forces. 
2. Performance Measurement 
This decade has witnessed an increasing focus both in private industry and the 
government to improve the quality of goods and services and to increase customer 
satisfaction. Inherent in this has been a drive to develop organizational goals, objectives, 
and performance metrics by which to measure success of these efforts. Two important 
pieces of legislation have been enacted which seek to inculcate these ideas of quality 
improvement into the day-to-day operations of the federal government. They are the 
Chief Financial Officer's Act of 1990, and the Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993. 
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a. Chief Financial Officer's Act 
By the end of the 1980s there was a general belief that the financial 
management functions of the Federal Government required improvement. Topical issues 
included waste, fraud and abuse, and inadequate financial disclosure of federal programs. 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act. The purposes of the 
Act were to: [Ref 4 & 5] 
• Bring more effective general and financial management practices to the Federal 
Government. 
• Provide for improvement in systems of accounting, financial management, and 
internal controls. 
• Provide for the production of complete, reliable, timely, and consistent 
financial information for use by the Executive branch and Congress in the 
financing, management, and evaluation of Federal programs. 
h. Government Performance and Results Act 
In 1993, President Clinton announced a government-wide initiative headed 
by Vice-President Gore to reinvent government. The initiative was called the National 
Performance Review. In support of that effort, Congress passed and the President signed 
into law the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. GPRA requires 
that federal agencies develop strategic plans for how they will deliver high quality 
products and services to the American people [Ref 4]. A few of the stated purposes of 
the Act were to [Ref 5]: 
• Improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the Federal 
Government. 
• Initiate program reform by requiring managers to set goals, measure 
performance against those goals, and then report publicly on their results. 
• Promote a new focus on results, service quality, and customer satisfaction. 
• Improve internal management of the Federal Government. 
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GPRA requires that each agency of the Federal Government submit to 
Congress a strategic plan for program activities. These plans are to include a mission 
statement, goals and objectives, a description of how they are to be achieved, and a 
description ofthe measures to be used to evaluate program performance. Additionally, by 
the year 2000 each agency will be required to report on program performance for the 
previous fiscal year. [Ref 5] 
c. DOD and the National Performance Review 
The CFO Act and GPRA highlight an intensive effort by the Federal 
Government to significantly improve internal financial and program management. By 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government, higher quality work could be 
accomplished with fewer personnel. Reducing labor also provides for reduction in 
infrastructure. In combination these two outcomes, reduced labor and infrastructure cost, 
have allowed for smaller budgets and have led to the first balanced budget in twenty-five 
years. This has also required the DOD to "do more with less". 
To support the President's NPR, DOD listed several actions the services 
would take. [Ref 6] 
• Create a clear sense of mission. 
• Replace regulations with incentives. 
• Expose federal operations to competition. 
• Search for market, not administrative solutions. 
• Measure our success by customer satisfaction. 
d The Navy's Plan 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, increased emphasis in stewardship of public 
funds, and the drive for a balanced budget have all resulted in steadily shrinking defense 
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budgets. From 1990 to 1998 there has been a 36.4% decrease in Navy outlays (constant 
FY98 dollars). This has required the Navy (as well as the other services) to dramatically 
reduce personnel, equipment and infrastructure. All of this has occurred while maintaining 
national defense, and supporting missions in the Mideast, Somalia, Bosnia, and Asia. 
In support of this "rightsizing" of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) established several working groups tasked with implementing CFO/GPRA. The 
goal was to implement the four "national metrics": cost effectiveness, overhead reduction, 
customer satisfaction, and infrastructure reduction within the Navy. One of the results has 
been the Regional Naval Maintenance Plan. The objectives as set forth by the CNO in 
1994 are to: [Ref 7] 
• Emphasize process improvement while maintaining customer responsiveness 
and fleet readiness. 
• Eliminate excess infrastructure capacity and capability. 
• Better integrate supply support and maintenance requirements. 
• Provide management visibility of all maintenance-related costs. 
• Provide compatible ADP management across all levels of maintenance. 
• Preserve the requirement for positive technical control. 
• Reflect DOD and Navy "core competencies" policy. 
Out of this effort, the Pearl Harbor Fleet Maintenance Pilot was initiated. 
3. The Navy Maintenance Concept 
The Navy employs a three tiered maintenance concept as follows: 
• Organizational - Maintenance work accomplished by the individual unit. 
• Intermediate - Repair work beyond the capability of the individual units 
accomplished by Navy (and some civilian) personnel at various shore and 
tender based Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs). 
• . Depot - Major repair work and improvements accomplished at public and 
private shipyards. 
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a. Organizational Maintenance 
This level covers all of the maintenance that is performed by the crew of 
the ship and is typified by the lowest level of technical difficulty. Both corrective and 
preventive maintenance is performed. A ship's ability to "fix itself' is a vital component of 
material readiness. A ship's crew must be able to identify and correct system/equipment 
problems as they occur. While at-sea emergent repairs do not happen too often, the crew 
must be able to rapidly correct material problems in order to stay at sea to support 
operational tasking. To foster the ability to carry out this tasking, ship crews attempt to 
fix as much broken equipment as possible. By doing this, personnel get training in many 
different areas of maintenance. This on-the-job training and experience improves the 
quality of the work they perform, and instills in them a "fix-it-yourself' attitude. Unit 
morale and readiness are improved. Some maintenance or repair problems are beyond the 
ship's capability to fix. In these instances the work is passed to the Intermediate-level. 
h. Intermediate Maintenance 
Intermediate Maintenance Facilities provide the next level of maintenance 
support. In general this maintenance is more technically demanding than the 
organizational maintenance. The work is completed by naval personnel assigned to the 
maintenance facility for a shore tour. Some I-level activities also use civilian personnel. 
Intermediate Maintenance is budgeted for $240.3 million for FY 1998 [Ref 2]. However, 
this is misleading because it includes only the cost of the operation of the facilities and 
civilian personnel pay. It excludes the pay for Navy personnel who also work at the 
IMAs. More complete cost visibility in this area would facilitate a better understanding of 
where potential savings might be realized during a re-engineering effort. 
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c. Depot Maintenance 
Depot-level work is the most technically demanding and is usually 
completed during CNO Scheduled Availabilities. These are generally significant long-term 
repairs and ship/system improvements that are beyond the capability of the other two 
levels. Depot maintenance activities will also perform maintenance at the organizational 
and intermediate level when tasked by Fleet Commanders. This is usually done to ensure 
a ship meets an operational schedule. Depot maintenance is performed in one of the four 
Naval Shipyards (NSYs) or one of the many private shipyards around the country. The 
workforce is composed of experienced civilian personnel. 
4. The Pearl Harbor Fleet Maintenance Pilot 
In Pearl Harbor there is a Naval Shipyard (PHNSy) one hundred yards across the 
harbor from the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility (NIMF). As each of the 
organizations is tasked with planning and executing ship maintenance, there is some 
amount of redundancy. If these activities can be consolidated, there exists the potential to 
reduce resource consumption and the fixed costs of operations. For a Working Capital 
Funded (WCF) organization (pHNSy), this would tend to reduce the unit cost goal and, 
therefore, the price customers pay for services. For a mission-funded organization 
(NIMF) the lower operating costs would result in lower budgetary requirements. In both 
cases, resources not used for ship maintenance could be shifted to support the Navy's war 
fighting capabilities. 
The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CPF) and Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NA VSEA) initiated the Pearl Harbor Fleet Maintenance Pilot (FMP) program 
to consolid~te PHNSY and the NIMF. The new organization, named "Pearl Harbor Naval 
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Shipyard & Intennediate Maintenance Facility" (pHNSY & IMFAC) officially "stood-up" 
in April 1998. The FMP is an initiative to strategically rethink the way ship maintenance is 
managed. A portion of the vision statement reads: [Ref 8] 
... Increase the quantity of ship work accomplished in the region through 
integration of I and D level resources in such a manner that reduces 
overhead infrastructure while creating increased shipboard productive 
capacity. 
The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD) is concerned about how the Navy 
will measure "increased shipboard productive capacity". Program Budget Decision 404, 
approved by OUSD in December 1997 and issued to the Navy, states, " ... the end-state of 
the pilot is not defined in tenns of what will be the measurements for success ... ". In 
Hawaii, the FMP Transition Team has proposed several perfonnance metrics they believe 
will be useful in measuring the status of the pilot program. The question is, do these 
metrics measure the areas of perfonnance which work toward achieving the Pearl Harbor 
NSY & IMF strategic vision? 
5. The Business Community and Performance Measures 
There is a large body of literature available, which looks specifically at business 
perfonnance measurements. Many corporations, to strategically rethink the way they do 
business and measure success, are using Robert S. Kaplan's and David P. Norton's 
concept of the ''Balanced Scorecard" [Ref 26]. Can this same concept provide clues to 
improving operations and performance measurement in a Navy maintenance facility? This 
is the issue that is addressed in this thesis. 
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B. OBJECTIVES 
This research examines the issues surrounding the consolidation of the Naval 
Shipyard and the InteInlediate Maintenance Facility in Pearl Harbor. In particular, 
perfoInlance metrics which have been proposed as part of the Congressionally required 
test plan are evaluated. Additionally, the maintenance processes of the consolidated 
organization are evaluated for other metrics that are useful in measuring the perfoInlance 
output of the organization. 
The primary research goal is to determine what perfoInlance metrics can be used 
to measure the success of the consolidation of Depot and InteInlediate Ship Maintenance 
in Pearl Harbor. 
C. SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide an outside evaluation of the perfoImance 
metrics proposed by NAVSEA and the Naval Audit Service (NAS). This was 
accomplished by: 
• Evaluating the perfoInlance metrics established by NA VSEA and the NAS. 
• Examining the financial and operations data from PHNSY and NIMF looking 
for possible alternative perfoImance measures. 
• Estimating expected perfoInlance improvements resulting from the 
consolidation. 
• UtiIizing data from the PHNSY and NIMF financial statements and the 




The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
• Conducting a literature review in the area of budgeting within the Federal 
Government and the Department of Defense. The review targeted the Ship 
Depot Maintenance and Intermediate Maintenance issues. 
• Conducting a literature review of current initiatives to institute strategic 
planning and performance measures in the private sector. 
• Performing an analysis of the costs, production performance, and infrastructure 
ofPHNSY and NIMF. This included a detailed examination of the following: 
• Trail Balance Reports (NC 2199) 
• Expense Element Reports (NC 2171) 
• Status of Funds Authorized Reports (NC 2025) 
• Financial and Operating Statements 
• CPF's Regional Maintenance Initiatives 
• Pertinent manning documents 
• NA VSEA guidance regarding the operation of Naval Shipyards 
• Analyzing productivity metrics developed by CPF, NA VSEA, PHNSY, and 
NIMF to evaluate maintenance performance. 
• Conducting a search for private shipyard data in order to build a composite 
"industry" financial picture against which PHNSY could be compared. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter I is the Introduction. 
• Chapter II provides an overview of Naval Ship Maintenance Program. 
• Chapter ill examines the history and background of the Pearl Harbor Fleet 
Maintenance Pilot and presents the performance metrics proposed by 
NAVSEA and the NAS. 
• Chapter IV introduces the concept of strategic planning and performance 
measurement systems and describes the "Balanced Scorecard." 
• Chapter V discusses measures of performance as they can apply to the 
consolidated organization, PHNSY & IMF AC. 
• Chapter VI discusses findings, conclusions and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. THE NAVY MAINTENANCE SYSTEM 
A. BACKGROUND 
OPNAVINST 4700.7J (Maintenance Policy for Naval Ships), states the Chief of 
Naval Operation's (CNO) guiding policy for the maintenance of naval ships: 
Ships shall be maintained in a safe material condition, adequate to allow 
accomplishment of assigned missions. 
The program designated to accomplish this policy is the Naval Ship Maintenance Program 
(NSMP). The NSMP is designed to keep naval ships in the highest possible state of 
readiness. (Another program, the Fleet Modernization Program (FMP) is designed to 
maintain ship configuration as system changes are authorized. The FMP will be addressed 
as required; however, it is not the focus of the thesis.) 
1. The Naval Ship Maintenance Program (NSMP) 
Before any discussion of the NSMP can begin, we must define maintenance. Ship 
maintenance can be divided into two major categories, preventive and corrective. 
Preventive maintenance is that work which seeks to ensure the continued proper operation 
of equipment and systems. Inspections, greasing, changing oil and filters, calibration, and 
component replacement are performed on properly operating equipment in an effort to 
prevent their untimely failure. This maintenance is controlled by the Planned Maintenance 
System (PMS). Preventive maintenance is scheduled and performed on 
equipment/systems at periodicities ranging from four hours to one or more years. If the 
maintenance is not performed at the required periodicity, it is considered "deferred". 
Some preventive maintenance is very easy, some very difficult. The Maintenance and 
Material Management (3M) program developed the PMS in an effort to keep 
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equipment/systems operating within engineering specifications for as long as possible. 
This reduces the likelihood and occurrence of failures. The other type of maintenance, 
corrective, is work performed on equipment that has failed or is not operating at design 
capacity/efficiency. 
a. Documentation 
To function properly the NS:MP and 3M program require a documentation 
system to keep track of maintenance. The Maintenance Data System (MDS) is the central 
database of maintenance information. The ship's maintenance personnel enter information 
into the database via OPNAV Form 2KJCK. Many reports can be generated from MDS. 
The most important of these is the Consolidated Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP). The 
CSMP is the central collection point for all information regarding the maintenance history 
of a ship. It is maintained by the ship and contains all corrective, deferred corrective, 
deferred preventive maintenance, and alteration actions. After a maintenance item is 
entered onto a 2KJCK, it is up-line reported to the MDS. The MDS central database is 
reviewed frequently by higher authorities. One of these, NA VSEA, keeps track of 
equipment/system problems and trends. As the Navy's engineering authority it is tasked 
with providing guidance, alterations, and improvements to all ships in the Navy to keep 
their equipment/systems operating properly. It is, therefore, imperative that the CSMP be 
correct and current. [Ref 9] 
Form 2Ks are generated on the ship by the work center responsible for the 
particular equipment/system involved. On this form the workers describe the problem and 
provide technical and supply information about the equipment/system. Two important 
items to record are priority (PRI) and type availability (T/A). 
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• Priority 





3 Highly Desirable 
4 Desirable 
This code is the ship's first cut of the importance of the job. This job prioritization is 
reported to the ship's Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) and the local maintenance 
activity and plays an integral part in planning maintenance. This code is subject to 
approval from the ISIC and the maintenance activity. Since the highest effort is put into 
the PRI 2 jobs (PRI 1 is rarely assigned), they are scrutinized very closely. 
• Type availability 
Type availability (TI A) codes describe who is best capable of performing 









Other technical assistance 
Ship's force 
This code determines which organization actually perfonns the work. As the ship's work 
package flows from the ship to the ISIC. to the maintenance activity, each organization 
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gets a "cut" on the acceptability of this code. The ship may think that a particular job is 
within its capability (TtA 4). However the ISle may feel, based on previous experience 
with other ships, that the work should be performed by an intermediate maintenance 
activity (TtA 2). This code can be very useful in breaking down the eSMP into 
component sections based on which organization is tasked with which repair. This will be 
important later. 
2. NSMP Structure 
To support the NSMP, the Navy employs a three level maintenance echelon. Each 
of these is discussed below. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE 
Personnel assigned to the ship normally perform this level of maintenance. O-level 
maintenance usually consists of preventive maintenance and simple corrective 
maintenance. The majority of the jobs listed in the eSMP are worked at the 
organizational level. The organizational level allows for the training of Navy personnel in 
many different types of maintenance techniques. This on-the-job training and experience 
improves the quality of the work they perform and instills in them a "fix-it-yourself' 
attitude. Unit morale and readiness are improved. Work beyond the unit's ability to fix is 
passed to the Intermediate-level. 
Typical O-level maintenance actions include: [Ref 10] 
• Facilities maintenance, such as cleaning and preservation. 
• Routine systems and component preventive maintenance, such as inspections, 
systems operability tests and diagnostics, lubrication, calibration, and cleaning. 
14 
• Corrective maintenance, such as hull, mechanical, electrical, and electronic 
troubleshooting down to the lowest replaceable unit level, miniature and 
microminiature (2M) electronic repair, and minor repairs to components to 
restore operation. 
• Assistance to higher-level maintenance activities. 
• Verification and quality assurance of maintenance accomplished by other 
activities. 
• Documentation of all deferred and completed maintenance actions, whether 
accomplished by ship's force of by other activities. 
Each ship is equipped with an automated system called the Shipboard Non-tactical 
Automation Program (SNAP). This system is the central point for descriptions of 
maintenance problems and tracking of supply parts ordered to fix the problems. Newer 
versions of the system also include all of the ship's technical drawings and manuals. A 
worker can log into the system and research the drawings/manuals for sources of the 
problem or for troubleshooting guides. He then calls up a "Form 2-Kilo" (2K), describes 
the problem, and orders the parts necessary to fix the problem. Additionally, he can write 
a work package to fix and retest the problem. The database of all of the 2Ks generated is 
CSMP. The CSMP is the ship's formal listing of all known material issues. The ship 
distributes the CSMP to its ISIC and to the local IMA. 
C. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) are chartered with providing 
intermediate-level maintenance and related support work to assigned ships. They also 
provide maintenance training to the assigned Navy personnel. As with the Organizational-
level, this training improves worker level of knowledge and unit readiness. Additionally, 
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the IMA provides an adequate sea/shore rotation to support the professional and personal 
growth of the individual. This improves quality of life and retention. 
I-level maintenance includes: [Ref 10] 
• Preventive maintenance. 
• Corrective maintenance. 
• Tests and inspections. 
• Provision of services such as electrical power, water, gas and air 
replenishment, and tool issue. 
• Installation of alterations. 
• Work on electronic 2M printed circuit boards, components, modules, 
subassemblies, and other equipment coded for I-level repair. 
• Calibration and repair services for electrical and electronic test and monitoring 
equipment; pressure; vacuum, and temperature measuring devices; and 
mechanical measuring instruments. 
• Technical assistance to ship's force in diagnosing system or equipment 
problems and assistance in repairs, as necessary. 
• Assistance in the emergency repair and manufacture of unavailable replacement 
parts or assemblies. 
!MAs are located at many sites around the country and overseas. They come in 
two basic varieties, ship based and shore based. Afloat !MAs are on tenders and repair 
ships. Their mobility provides Fleet Commanders with a rapidly deployable repair facility 
that can repair battle damaged ships closer to the action. The Navy currently has four 
submarine tenders, four destroyer tenders, and two repair ships. The typical afloat IMA 
has approximately 1200 personnel assigned, of which about 700 are assigned to the Repair 
Department. The second type, Ashore !MAs come in several varieties. These are Shore 
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMA), Intermediate Maintenance Facilities (IMF), 
Trident Refit Facilities (TRF), and Naval Submarine Support Facilities (NSSF). 
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1. IMA Structure 
Intermediate maintenance activities utilize the typical Navy hierarchy of COIXO, 
departments, divisions, and work centers. Figure 2.1 below is a graphical representation 
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Figure 2.1. The typical IMA organizational chart. 
2. The Process 
Ships undergo maintenance availabilities three to four times a year. The 
availabilities last from three to· five weeks depending upon the type of ship. There are 
three distinct phases to the upkeep cycle. Phase One is the ship's early identification of 
material issues. This consists of ship's personnel conducting rigorous material inspections, 
performing planned preventive maintenance, and closely observing the ship's day-to-day 
operations. From this, a detailed listing of actual and potential problems is generated and 
the upkeep is planned. As discussed above, problems are entered into SNAP and a 2K for 
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each material issue is generated. The 2K is assigned a unique number called a Job Control 
Number (JCN). Each 2K is reviewed through the ship's chain of command and ultimately 
agreed to by the Commanding Officer. SNAP computer data tapes are made every few 
days (while in port) and given to the ISIC, where they are "screened" for validity. In this 
step, the ISIC reviews the 2K the ship has coded for Intermediate or Depot 
accomplishment (T I A 2 or 1 respectively) to determine if the work required to fix the 
problem is really beyond the ship's capability. Ifhe concurs, the 2K is accepted, and the 
work is assigned to the local IMA for the next upkeep (if T I A 2), or deferred until the next 
depot availability (ifT/A 1). If the ISIC disagrees with the ship's assessment of the degree 
of difficulty of the work, he returns the 2K to ship with his justification. (As a side note, 
2Ks are not often returned to the ship for this reason). 
Thirty-five days prior to the start of the availability, the ISIC formally delivers the 
work package to the IMA. Five days later, the ISIC, IMA and ship hold a Work Definition 
Conference (WOC). At the WDC, all parties discuss the ship's CSMP (the 2K database) 
and agree which jobs will be worked and by whom. Once agreement is reached (this is 
usually a short meeting), Phase Two of the process begins. At the IMA the 2Ks are read 
by central processing and assigned a Lead Shop. The Lead Shop reviews the 2Ks for 
content and completeness. Depending on the nature of the problem, the Lead Shop may 
go to the ship for a 'ship check'. 'Ship checks' are the standard method !MAs use to 
ensure that the problem described in the 2K is the actual problem the ship is trying to fix. 
If the 2K matches the problem, the Lead Shop sends it to the Planning Department. 
Planning researches technical drawings and manuals, orders repair parts, and writes the 
work package. The Lead Shop holds the work package until the start of the upkeep. 
18 
From the WDC to the beginning of the upkeep, the ship continues to submit 2Ks as new 
problems arise. 
Phase Three begins with the start of the upkeep. Three days after the start of the 
upkeep an Anival Conference (AC) is held. This is a formal meeting attended by the 
ship's Commanding Officer, the ISIC Commander, the IMA Commanding Officer, and the 
ship's and IMA's top management. Each job (2K) to be worked by the IMA is discussed. 
The big jobs are discussed in more detail. Important pieces of information are status of 
the work package, status of repair parts, and status of the plant conditions required to 
start repairs. 
During the upkeep, many meetings are held to track work progress. Daily 
Production and Night Work meetings are held by the IMA's Repair Officer (RO) (an 
Engineering Duty Officer Commander). The ISIC Material Officer (Lieutenant 
Commander), the ship's Engineer (Lieutenant Commander), the Ship Superintendent 
(IMA liaison to the ship - a senior, experienced enlisted person), and the Lead Shop 
supervisors attend these meetings. Every week the IMA Commanding Officer holds the 
Management meeting with the ship's Commanding Officer and the ISIC Commander. At 
this meeting, the RO briefs the status of all IMA work. The intent of this very important, 
high profile, face-to-face meeting is to provide upper management with a formal feedback 
mechanism that lets them keep track of the status of the upkeep. Informally, the ship's 
Engineer and the IMA's Ship Superintendent brief the ship's Commanding Officer daily. 
On the IMA side, the RO briefs the IMA Commanding Officer daily. These meetings 
should keep the number of surprises to a minimum. 
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Two days prior to the end of the upkeep, the IMA Commanding Officer holds his 
final meeting. The flow of the upkeep is discussed, as well as lessons learned. A very 
important part of the meeting is the discussion of which work was not started. This 
deferred work is formally assigned to the next upkeep. Phase One begins again when the 
ship gets underway for post upkeep sea trials. 
The success of an upkeep depends on the close working relationship between the 
ship and the IMA. Numerous sensors are in place in the form of the many meetings that 
detail the progress of the upkeep. Some of these same meetings afford the opportunity for 
both formal and informal feedback to the process. The Lead Shops also track upkeep 
progress. They use production charts, scheduling programs, and computer printouts to 
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Figure 2.2. A simplified flowchart of the IMA process. 
Upkeep is difficult for both the ship and the IMA. Many thousands of man-hours 
and as much as several hundred thousand dollars are spent to get a ship out on time in 
good material condition. Both organizations are filled with "good people working hard" 
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to get the job done safely and correctly. Each ship undergoes this process three or four 
times a year. The Navy currently has 347 ships [Ref 11]. That is a lot of time and energy 
being spent on the management and execution of ship maintenance. 
3. Financial Management 
All I-level maintenance is mission-funded. This means that the funds are 
appropriated annually as part of the Operations and Maintenance - Navy (OMN) budget 
line. The funding is provided by Fleet Commanders through the Type Commanders 
(TYCOMs). Funding is for material, facilities, and some civilian salaries. For FY 1998,1-
level maintenance is budgeted for $240.3 million [Ref 2]. This number, however, is 
misleading as it includes only the cost of the operation of the facilities and civilian 
personnel pay. It excludes Navy personnel who also work at the I-level facilities but are 
funded from the Military Personnel budget line. 
This system utilizes the Standard Accounting and Reporting System - Fleet Level 
(STARS-FL) system for reporting. The two most frequently used reports are the Trial 
Balance Report (NavCompt form 2199) and the Expense Element Report (NavCompt 
form 2171). Examples of the NIMF's NavCompt forms 2199 and 2171 can be found in 
Appendix A. 
A quick glance at these two reports does not tell the reader very much. The 
reports are not user friendly. The accounts are not very well laid out and their names do 
not lend themselves to immediate understanding. Those who use the reports on a daily 
basis understand the way the material is presented. To be fair to the two reports, they are 
designed to keep the comptroller informed of the status of hislher budget. A mission-
funded organization must not overspend its budget. To that end, the NavCompt forms 
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2199 and 2171 are very useful. However, other personnel, including Commanding 
Officers of mission-funded activities, who are charged with overall fiduciary responsibility, 
are not able to easily understand them. One of the goals of the CFO Act of 1990 is to 
make such reports more useful to a wider audience. There are new versions of these 
reports, which look more like the traditional balance sheets and income statements, but 
they have not yet been approved for general use. Anything which can be done to improve 
the way in which these important reports tell the financial story of mission-funded 
activities will be greatly appreciated by those who do not use these reports on a daily 
basis. 
Mission-funded activities are not supposed to go "over budget". By tracking 
obligation rates, the activity can determine its expenditure pattern versus its budget. It can 
then tighten the belt if it looks as though it will run out of money prior to the end of the 
year. It can ask for more money via a supplemental request. This is an arduous process 
for the activity. The supplemental request provides a complete description of the events 
leading up to the need for more money. In some cases it may be due to emergent 
expenditures that were required as a part of the activity'S mission. In other cases it may be 
due to poor budget estimates. In either event, the activity must ask its boss for more 
money. !fit does not get the funds, activities cease until the issue is resolved. 
4. Maintenance Reporting Management System 
The Maintenance Reporting Management System (MRMS) is a software 
application package in use at both ashore and afloat IMAs. It supports a variety of 
maintenance-related functions for work brokers and repair activities. MRMS is designed 
to meet the following objectives: [Ref 12] 
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• Schedule jobs that are within a repair activity's capability and capacity. 
• Procure the correct materials to do the job. 
• Complete the job within the required time frame. 
• Complete the highest priority jobs first. 
• Ensure the jobs are properly documented. 
MRMS is a Management Information System (MIS) which inputs the ship's CSMP 
then tracks each entry through the chain of events leading to completion of the job. This 
chain starts with the work broker, the ISIC. Jobs beyond the ship's capability or capacity 
are "screened" to a regional repair activity. Most work is sent to the I-level. The IMA 
accesses the ship's file in MRMS, accepts ( or rejects) each job, and then submits them 
throughout the activity in the form of an Automated Work Request (AWR). At each 
stage of the process data is entered into the A WR. In this way management can track the 
progress of each job. MRMS tracks material which was ordered for the job and the time 
spent working on the job. Each shop has a "time keeper" who is responsible for entering 
his/her shop's expended time into the A WR. This data is used not only to track progress 
but also to track performance statistics of each shop and the total activity. To explain this 
we must first look at some definitions. [Ref 12] 
a. Definitions 
• Repair Labor. All personnel who are permanently or temporarily assigned to 
IMA standard productive work centers and accomplish work directly 
identifiable to JCNs. 
• Productive Labor. That labor directly spent in the repair, manufacture, or 
maintenance of any equipment or component. Only personnel routinely 
spending 51 % or more of their time doing this type of work are considered 
productive. 
• Productive Support Labor. Labor spent in the supervision of productive labor 
personnel or in support of productive effort. Again the 51 % rule applies. 
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• Gross Productive Support Man-hours. Calculated by multiplying the number 
of Productive Support Labor personnel by eight hours (the tended day). 
• Total Man-hours Assigned. Calculated by multiplying the total number of 
personnel assigned (sum of Productive Labor and Productive Support Labor) 
by eight hours. The lunch hour is not part of the eight hours. 
• Gross Productive Man-hours (Gross PAM) is calculated by subtracting Gross 
Productive Support Man-hours from Total Man-hours Assigned. 
• Earned Man-hours. The number of planned man-hours to complete a job. 
• Expended Man-hours. The actual number of man-hours a job took to 
complete. This includes Lost Time. 
• Lost Time Man-hours. Time lost due to unplanned job delays. This includes 
such things as job scope changes, wrong material, accessibility to the job site, 
etc. 
• Man-hours Unassigned to JCNs. Man-hours available for work but not 
assigned due to a lack of JCNs. Workers physically present but not working. 
• Man-hour Deductions. Man-hours not available due to schools or training, 
medical or dental appointments, administrative or legal appointments, military 
duties, special liberty, etc. This is further subdivided into Production and 
Production Support categories. 
• Net Productive Available Man-hours (Net PAM). Gross PAM minus Man-
hour Deductions. There is also a Support component called Net Support 
Available Man-hours. 
• Unaccounted Time. The difference between Net PAM and the sum of Earned 
Man-hours, Lost Time Man-hours, and Man-hours Unassigned to JCNs. 
These terms are in daily use throughout the IMA. They are used to track 
progress and measure performance. In addition to the man-hour numbers, a series of 
ratios using the numbers have been developed as Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). The 
MOEs are tracked by the IMA, at Fleet Headquarters, and at NA VSEA Appendix B 
shows NIMF's "numbers" for FY 1997. The MOEs are divided into four areas. These are 
performance, utilization, productivity, and process management. The performance and 
utilization MOEs for NIMF in FY 1997 are: 
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• Performance is calculated by dividing Earned m/hrs by Net Productive Man-
hours. The ratio measures the planned maintenance m/hrs by the net number 
of production personnel m/hrs available to do the work. For FY 1997 NIMF's 
performance ratio was .913. This means that each net available mIhr resulted 
in .913 m/hrs of planned work. 
• Utilization is calculated by dividing Net PAM by Gross PAM. The ratio is a 
measure of the amount of m/hrs available for productive work after the 
"deduction time" is taken. For FY 1997 the ratio was .681. This means that 
NIMF lost 31.9% (1-.681) of their net available m/hrs to deductions (see above 
for definition). As we will see in Chapter V, there is Navy guidance that states 
that the deduction percentage should be about 16.6%. In FY 1997, NIMF was 
nearly double that percentage. 
D. DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
Depot-level work is generally limited to significant long term repairs, and 
ship/system improvements that are beyond the capability of the other two levels. This 
maintenance is performed in CNO Scheduled Availabilities. Depot maintenance activities 
also perform Intermediate-level maintenance when tasked by Fleet Commanders to 
support ship schedules. Experienced, civilian personnel perform depot-level maintenance 
in one of the four NSY s or one of the many private shipyards around the country. 
To minimize conflicts in the work that is performed in the NSY s and to aid the 
maintenance planning process, OPNAVINST 4700.7J [Ref 10] prescribes the following 
priorities (listed in descending order): 
• Work associated with the Trident program. 
• Voyage repairs. 
• Work on ships being prepared for deployment. 
• CNO-scheduled depot maintenance availabilities. 
• Restricted AvailabilitylTechnical Availability (RA VITA V) 
• Other U.S. Navy ship availabilities, except for inactivation or disposal. 
• . Refurbishment of repairables. 
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• Work on other U. S. Government ships. 
• Inactivation or disposal availabilities. 
• Work on foreign ships. 
1. Types of eNO Scheduled Availabilities 
Depot maintenance is performed in many types of availabilities. The list includes: 
[Ref 33] 
• Overhaul 
• Depot Modernization Period (DMP) 
• Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) 
• Phased Maintenance Availability (PMA) 
• RAVITAV 
• Voyage Repair (VR) Availability 
• Fitting-Out Availability (FaA) 
• Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) 
• Inactivation Availability 
• Activation Availability 
2. Locations 
NSY s are located m Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Puget Sound (Bremerton), 
Washington, Norfolk, Virginia, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In addition to the 
NSY s, naval depot maintenance is carried out in many private shipyards throughout the 
country. The six largest ones are Newport News Shipbuilding, Ingalls Shipbuilding, Bath 
Iron Works, Electric Boat, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, and Avondale 
Industries. NSY s perform only ship repair and improvement work. Private shipyards 
perform this work as well as all new construction work. 
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3. Structure 
NSY s report to their respective Fleet Commanders. A second link is to NA VSEA, 
which provides the governing guidance concerning NSY operations and management. 
Figure 2.3 shows the organization chart of a typical NSY. 
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Figure 2.3. The typical Naval Shipyard organizational structure. 
4. The Process 
The process of assigning work to a depot maintenance facility is much the same as 
in the I-level case. Some differences occur in the way jobs are input to the cycle. The 
CSMP itself does not go to the NSY. It is routed through the ship's ISIC, TYCOM, the 
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Fleet and then into the Baseline Advanced Industrial Management (BAlM). Rather than 
JCNs, NSYs deal in Job Order Numbers (JONs). Depot availabilities are very large in 
scope and they mainly work at the system level instead of the component level. Normally, 
several JCNs are rolled into one JON. JONs are grouped into categories based on the 
system they involve. While !MAs work with JCN s tied directly to the CSMP, NSY s work 
with JONs tied to the work package. 
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Figure 2.4. A simplified view of the Depot process. [Refs. 13 & 33] 
The internal process of a NSY is similar to an IMA, only on a grander scale. 
Figure 2.4 provides a simplified view of the depot process. The scope of work performed 
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by NSYs is bigger than that accomplished at the I-level. As a result, planning for work 
and procurement of materials usually has a longer lead-time. NSY s use a process called 
Project Management. In this process, one individual is assigned the responsibility of 
overseeing the planning and execution of each "project" (ship) assigned to the NSY. 
5. Financial Management 
NSYs are funded from the depot maintenance Navy Working Capital Fund. 
a. Background 
The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) was established in 1991 
for the purpose of transforming selected defense operations into more business-like 
management processes. It was felt that, by increasing cost visibility at all levels of 
management, goods and services could be offered at lower costs. This would occur 
because management would remove or reduce non-value added processes and thereby 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. Quality of goods and services provided to customers 
would also improve. The result would be satisfied customers and lower levels of resource 
consumption. The areas selected for inclusion in the DBOF were depot maintenance, 
transportation, supply management, and finance and accounting. [Ref 31] 
In FY96, the fund was divided into four separate funds: one each for the 
Navy, Army, Air Force, and DOD components. The new funds were renamed Working 
Capital Funds (WCF). This reorganization was directed by the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C» to give each service total responsibility over its own 
business operations. [Ref 31] 
The idea of the WCFs is that a particular business area's revenue covers all 
costs of operation. This is accomplished by setting unit costs for goods and services (the 
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price the customer pays) at a rate such that costs incurred per unit equal revenue received 
per unit. This should result in a net operating result (NOR) of zero. [Ref 31] 
The WCF system allows an activity to borrow against the future. This 
means that, if execution will go over budget, the negative NOR is carried into the next 
year. The year-to-year accumulation of NOR is called the Accumulated Operating Result 
(AOR). WCF rules state that AOR must be passed on to the customer. If AOR is 
positive, the customer's rates are reduced. If AOR is negative, the customer's rate is 
increased through the use of a "surcharge" which is added to the following year's unit cost. 
[Ref 3] 
In order to provide price stability for the customer throughout the fiscal 
year, the unit cost for any particular good/service is set during the previous fiscal year. 
This facilitates customer budgetary planning but requires the business operation to 
estimate many future transactions. A few of the significant estimates include the number 
of units to be sold, labor costs, material costs, and facilities costs. Several Catch-22 issues 
arise with this system. The primary one is that the customer may be unable to say 
precisely how many units are needed until the unit cost is known. The unit cost cannot be 
known until it is known how many units the customer wants. The result is that the unit 
cost charged may not recover all of the costs of operation. [Ref 31] 
The key to the effective operation of DOD WCFs is cash. The WCF 
operates in a very similar fashion to a household checkbook. Revenue from customers is 
an increase in cash balance, and disbursement (wages/salaries, material, etc.) is a decrease 
in cash balance. Since 1993, the funds have operated with a cash shortage. In that year 
business operations began advance billing their customers to cover cash shortages. This 
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helped with the cash flow problem, but did not improve the process of setting prices to 
cover costs. The FY 1996 reorganization of the fund into four separate, service-
controlled funds did improve the process, as each component is now accountable and 
responsible for its balance, and cash shortages have steadily decreased. However, the 
GAO estimated that at the end ofFY97 the AOR of all of the funds combined would be a 
loss of about $1.7 billion. Additionally, they estimated the end-of-year AOR for NSY s to 
be a loss of between $25 and $100 million. Since the idea ofWCFs is to break even over 
time, past losses must be recovered. To accomplish this, future unit costs must increase. 
[Ref 3] 
b. Budget 
The Navy's depot maintenance budget for FY 1997 was $3,282.9 million. 
This included $3,051.2 million from OMN and $231.7 million from the Shipbuilding and 
Conversion, Navy (SCN) budget. The SCN portion funded aircraft carrier refueling 
complex overhauls at Newport News Shipbuilding. Included in the OMN portion was 
$348.1 million of Congressionally directed Navy WCF surcharges. The surcharges were 
levied to "payoff' the negative cash balance from previous year's operations. PHNSY's 
portion of the Navy's depot maintenance budget for FY 1997 was $353.6 million. 
Removing the surcharge from the OMN portion of the budget shows that PHNSY 
received about 13.1% of the Navy's depot maintenance budget. [Ref 2] 
c. Cost visibility 
The accounting systems associated with the WCF provide a very detailed 
examination of NSY cost structures. The Navy Industrial Fund Reporting System 
(NIFRS) is the system into which all cost, production, and budget information is entered 
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for the NSYs. From this are generated the Financial and Operating (F&O) Statements for 
the NSY s. NIFRS also enables the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial 
Management and Comptroller (ASN (FM&C» to monitor budget execution throughout 
the fiscal year. Cost visibility is enhanced due to the nature of the reports in the F&O 
Statement. Balance sheets, income statements, and statements of cash flows are produced 
and look remarkably like those found in the private sector. Appendix C contains portions 
of the 1997 PHNSY F&O Statement. All costs are accounted for and are, where possible, 
assigned to a particular project. Even military personnel costs are included. This system 
contrasts markedly from I-level accounting. For example, IMA material costs are 
allocated to the job but labor costs are not. An IMA will know how much it cost to 
operate for the year; however, it will not be able to produce total costs figures for a 
particular upkeep. The NSY can provide that level of visibility. [Ref 34] 
6. Management Information Systems 
NSY s use a variety of systems to provide detailed personnel and material cost 
infonnation, job planning and scheduling infonnation, material ordering and tracking 
infonnation, and resource management infonnation. These Automated Infonnation 
Systems (AIS) contain two components. 
a. Baseline Advanced Industrial Management (BAlM) 
BAlM is both a concept and a system. As a concept it "follows a systems 
engineering approach to re-engineer the planning and management process for the 
industrial operations of naval shipyards." [Ref 22] The concept is designed to improve 
perfonnance by: [Ref 22] 
• . Providing simplified, complete work procedures to the workers. 
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• Improving data management and integration. 
• Providing work planning, estimating, and scheduling functions. 
• Reshaping and downsizing the organizational structure to take advantage of 
improved processes. 
As a system, BAIM consists of four main modules. These are: 
• SUPDESK is the time and attendance module that tracks employees through 
the use of direct and overhead JONs. 
• PMC is the performance, monitoring, and control module that provides 
detailed information regarding each project's (ship) jobs, budget, and schedule. 
Within the PMC module are two mini-modules, PCWLF and RSC. PCWLF is 
a workload forecasting application that takes progress information from PMC 
and schedule information from the Shipyard Management Information System 
(SYMIS) and projects upcoming manday requirements. RSC is a resource 
loading application that takes personnel input from PMC and workload 
forecast information from PCWLF and allocates resources to projects/jobs to 
obtain the most efficient mix. 
• PSS is the project scheduling and sequencing application which integrates job 
costing information from SYMIS with planning information from BAIM to 
schedule job accomplishment. 
• MR is the material requirement application which orders and tracks all material 
requested via work documents. 
An important portion of BAIM is the work package application. All work 
packages and documents are generated within BAIM. These documents are called Task 
Group Instructions (TGIs). To understand how TGIs work, we will first look at how the 
NSY work package is organized. Each ship is broken down into systems. The systems 
are further subdivided into component units. Each component unit has several work items 
which can be accomplished. An example would be as follows: 688-class submarine 
(project), engineering (department), air systems (system), high pressure air compressors 
(component), repair (work item). The component could have several work items, such as 
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clean and inspect, repair, replace, overhaul, or combinations of these. Each work item is 
covered by a TGI. Since much of the work performed on a ship is of a repetitive nature, 
TGls can and should be reused as much as possible to minimize "reinventing the wheel." 
There is a central database of the commonly used TGls. It is located at the Ship 
Availability Planning and Engineering Center (SHAPEC) in Portsmouth NSY. All four 
NSY s access SHAPEC to receive the TGls necessary to plan work on ships in their 
respective yards. [Ref 8, 13, & 14] 
h. Ship Yard Management Information System (SYMIS) 
SYMIS is a consolidated grouping of software applications that form the 
heart of the NSY's AlS. It is the shell that contains the applications that track the budget, 
cost accounting information, personnel information, and material. SYMIS is made up of 
[Ref. 14] 
• SABRS tracks budget execution and overhead cost accounting data. 
• PC creates a variety of reports in user specified formats. 
• COST is the overall financial tracking application. 
• MAT is the material ordering and tracking application. During the job 
planning phase material is identified as being required and it is automatically 
ordered by MAT. 
• PAYROLL contains the personnel database as well as the pay schedules. 
Many performance measures are employed in NSY s. As will be described in 
Chapter V, many of the measures required by NAVSEA are variance measures [Ref 21]. 
These include budget to actual variances for the areas of cost and schedule. PMC and 
COST are two key modules that provide much of the reported variance information. 
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E. SUMMARY 
The process of maintaining ships is complex and resource consuming. Outside of 
the individual ship, two systems are in place to provide expert technical support in 
maintaining Navy ships. IMAs and NSY s are staffed with personnel and equipment that 
enable them to perform any type of repair that may be required on a ship. In addition, 
there are numerous indicators in place to help management evaluate the financial and 
operational performance of their organizations. In an era of downward budgetary 
pressures, the senior leadership at both IMAs and NSYs are required to "do more with 
less. " This means more maintenance per dollar. This requires that work processes and 
MIS are carefully examined to ensure that each step in the development and execution of a 
ship's maintenance package is carried out with the ultimate goal in mind. That goal is to 
return a well-maintained warship to the Fleet Commander on time and within budget. 
Steps in the process that do not add value to the ultimate goal must be removed. This will 
increase productivity and reduce cost. This concept will be expanded in Chapter IV. 
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m. THE PEARL HARBOR FLEET MAINTENANCE PILOT 
A. IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY AND SAVE MONEY 
The CFO Act and GPRA combined with across-the-board cuts in the defense 
budget forced the DOD and the Navy to recognize the need to "re-structure" many 
programs in an effort to improve the efficient and effective use of funds. In 1994, the 
CNO released the results of the Maintenance Support Quality Management Board's 
(QMB) plan to reshape Navy maintenance for the 21st century. The QMB developed a 
Regional Maintenance Plan (RMP) that features a single maintenance management 
process. The objectives of the RMP are: [Ref 7] 
• Emphasize process improvement while maintaining customer responsiveness 
and fleet readiness. 
• Eliminate excess infrastructure capacity and capability. 
• Better integrate supply support and maintenance requirements. 
• Provide management visibility of all maintenance-related costs. 
• Provide compatible ADP management across all levels of maintenance. 
• Preserve the requirement for positive technical control. 
• Reflect DOD and Navy Core Competencies Policy. 
The CNO planned the maintenance restructuring in three phases. 
• Phase One - Optimize I-level interoperability by minimizing redundant capacity 
and capability. The integration in Pearl Harbor in 1996 of the Submarine Base 
IMA (SUBASE IMA) and the Pearl Harbor Shore IMA (PH SIMA) into the 
NIMF accomplished phase one. 
• Phase Two - Integrate I and D level activities. This phase is in progress with 
the consolidation ofPHNSY and NIMF. 
• Phase Three - Perform fleet maintenance with a single maintenance process 
supported by common business and production practices. This phase will be 
implemented during fiscal years 1997-1999. 
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To quote the CNO: [Ref 7] 
The Regional naval maintenance approach provides an excellent 
opportunity to preserve force levels through restructured maintenance 
support for our future naval forces without sacrificing responsiveness. 
Many of the concepts are significantly different from those currently in 
practice; support and innovation will be required from all in the chain of 
command ... 
1. Hawaii Regional Maintenance 
Due the close proximity of the many maintenance sites in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor 
was a logical choice to start the process of regionalization. Although other naval regions 
also began the process, none were as geographically fortunate as Hawaii. PHNSY, 
SUBASE IMA, and PH SIMA are all located within two miles of one another. 
a. I level consolidation 
In August 1995, the PH SIMA and the SUBASE IMA officially 
consolidated into one organization. The new organization was called the Naval 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility (NIMF). It was the first command in the Navy to 
combine both submarine and surface ship maintenance into one organization. About two 
thirds of the personnel and nearly 250 pieces of industrial plant equipment were moved 
from various locations to a new building to house the NIMF. Additionally, the two 
MRMS data management computer systems were merged. Since the new building was 
originally designed to house only SUBASE personne~ many of the previous buildings 
were kept open to support production work. As a result of the consolidation, a work 
force reduction was also accomplished. In this a very unique action was taken. Six 
hundred and ninety-eight military personnel were replaced with 504 experienced civilian 
technicians. Most of these civilian workers came from PHNSY after their previous 
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Reduction-In-Force (RIF) actions. By bringing in these civilian workers, sailors were able 
to return to sea to fill critical billets. Additionally, and more importantly, the action 
dramatically increased the maintenance experience of the average worker at the NIMF. 
[Ref 16] 
The NIMF now supports all of the ships stationed in Pearl Harbor (about 35), as 
well as visiting US and foreign Navy ships. 
h. I&D level consolidation 
In April of 1997, COMNAVSEASYSCOM (NAVSEA) issued a 
memorandum outlining the specific plan to consolidate PHNSY and the NIMF. In May of 
1997, CPF established the Pearl Harbor Regional Maintenance Pilot Executive Steering 
Committee (ESC). This committee was made up of representatives of PHNSY, NIMF, 
Commander Submarine Forces Pacific Fleet (CSP), CPF, and Commander Naval Surface 
Group Mid-Pacific (MIDP AC). They were tasked with managing the consolidation of the 
two organizations. Their goal was to formally stand-up "PHNSY & IMF AC" in April 
1998. 
B. I&D LEVEL CONSOLIDATION 
1. Tasking (CPFINA VSEA) 
Following the May 1997 formation of the ESC a series of meetings were held to 
discuss the feasibility of consolidating Hawaii's fleet maintenance activities. CPF began 
work on a pilot study report detailing the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the 
integrated organization. The CONOPS final report was completed in August 1997. It 
provides the framework for much of the information presented in this chapter. In 
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November 1997 a Memorandum-of-Agreement (MOA) was signed by CPF and NAVSEA 
providing the details of how the consolidation was to be accomplished. 
a. Working groups 
In addition to the CONOPS, eight working groups were formed to work 
out the details of the consolidation. The groups were headed by senior military or civilian 
personnel and were comprised of functional area experts from PHNSY, NIMF, CPF, CSP, 
and :MIDP AC. The functional areas included: 
• Resources 
• Budget/Comptroller 
• Engineering and Planning 
• Personnel and Administration 





The timeline established by the CONOPS was very ambitious. Table 3.1 
below lists the major milestones and the dates. 
Key Event Completed 
CNO tasking to regionalize maintenance March 1994 
I level consolidated May 1996 
I&D level consolidation tasked by CPFINA VSEA April 1997 
CPFINAVSEA Memorandum of Understanding regarding the 
September 1997 
consolidation 
Integrated Local Area Network operational September 1997 
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Integrated personnel administration organization established 
Trade skills/Job qualification cross-index completed 
Integrated resource allocation program in place and tested 
Non-nuclear supply functions out sourced to the Fleet Industrial 
Supply Center, Pearl Harbor (FISC) 
Integrated planning and estimating process established 
Integrated Quality Assurance program established 
Integrated comptroller established 
Integrated Business Department established 










Table 3.1. PHNSY & IMFACAC consolidation milestones. [Ref. 8] 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Organization Chart 
Figure 3.1 shows the organization chart for the consolidated PHNSY & IMF AC. 
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Figure 3.1. PHNSY & IMFACAC organization chart. [Ref. 8] 
There are three notes regarding the new organization chart. The CPFINAVSEA 
MOD stated that the organization of PHNSY & IMF ACAC would be along "normal" 
NSY lines as spelled out in the NSY Standard Organization and Regulations Manual. 
This required a lot of work to cross-reference the NSY codes/shops with the NIMF 
codes/shops. 
The second note regards the formation of two new groups within the Operations 
Department. These are the Fleet Maintenance Activity (FMA) - Submarines and the FMA 
- Surface. The FMAs are almost a throwback to the old days when SUBASE IMA and 
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PH SIMA were separate entities serving the two different communities. It is expected 
that expertise in a particular area of maintenance, combined with the ability to quickly 
bring in more help as workload demands, and with the single infrastructure of PHNSY & 
IMF AC, will improve production efficiencies in non-CNO scheduled availabilities. While 
this appears to contradict consolidation, the improved customer service aspects of 
"working with people we know," coupled with the infrastructure reduction efficiencies, 
should improve production performance in these areas. 
Finally, PHNSY and the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Pearl Harbor signed 
a memorandum of agreement to consolidate the supply function into the existing structure 
of the FISC. This was done to reduce inventory held by the shipyard and to send the 
supply function to an organization where that function is a core competency. PHNSY is 
not a supply center. FISC is a supply center. In addition to the transfer of material, there 
will be a transfer of personnel as well. FISC will operate what amounts to a small supply 
detachment within the shipyard to handle the supply function. 
2. Infrastructure 
The infrastructure consolidation is not yet complete. Current planning is to tum 
over 16 buildings to Naval Station Pearl Harbor. Additionally, the Controlled Industrial 
Area (CIA), the security area encompassing the shipyard, will be reduced in size. This will 
provide more pier space for the Naval Station and provide greater ship access for ship 
crews without the need for special identification badges. [Ref 8 & 18] 
3. Personnel 
In September 1997 a Congressional Conference Committee report regarding the 
consolidation stated, " ... the conferees direct that the Navy shall not make any changes to 
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the workforce in terms of total numbers of employees ... " This edict is required to be 
followed until such time as Congress approves permanent changes to the SDM process. 
This will not happen before fiscal year 2000. With this in mind, the PHNSY & Th1FAC 
consolidation will proceed with no RIFs. In the period prior to the CPFINAVSEA MOA 
regarding the consolidation (dated November 26, 1997), PHNSY had a total of 2846 
civilian and military personnel on the payroll. The NIMF had a total of 1564 personnel. 
Most of the NIl\.1F personnel are military (956 or 61.1 %). The NIl\.1F "onboard" 
personnel numbers are larger than the "authorized" numbers due to the I-level 
consolidation that occurred in 1996. Rather than cut billets and short-cycle sailors from 
shore duty back to sea duty, a decision was made to let the military manning levels reduce 
themselves via normal rotation attrition. For FY 1998, the NJMF's Authorized Manning 
Document (AMD) lists a military authorization of 710 personnel. 
As of April 30, 1998, PHNSY & Th1FAC had a total of 4061 personnel. The 
break down of personnel is: 
• 728 military (17.9%) 
• 1005 civilian General Schedule (GS) (24.8%) 
• 2328 civilian Wage Grade Supervisor (WS) and Workers (WN, WL, WG, 
WD, and WT) (57.3%) 
The difference in personnel counts between 1997 and 1998 (349 people) is due to 
normal civilian attrition and unfilled planned rotations of military personnel. Additionally, 
there is a difference between last year and today in the mix of workers and supervisors. 
As part of the consolidation, production shop makeup was changed. This involved 
reducing the numbers of supervisors by reassigning many of them to "production worker" 
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positions. There was a considerable effort by management to keep personnel in the same 
job title, series, and grade, and in most case that occurred. However, some reassignments 
were made. One of the stated goals of the consolidation was to improve productivity 
without increasing cost. One of the ways that will be accomplished is by increasing the 
number of production workers relative to the number of supervisors. In this way 
management hopes to improve productivity (more workers) while maintaining the same 
cost structure. Of course there are many human resource issues to deal with regarding the 
"downgrading" of personal stature that occurs when a supervisor becomes a worker. 
First, the union had to approve the plan. This was no easy task. Second is the issue of 
motivating the reassigned workers. The conversion plan keeps the converted personnel in 
the same job description, same pay, and same seniority. They do, however, go from being 
"white hats" (supervisors) to workers. How each individual will handle the loss of stature 
associated with the conversion remains to be seen. While increasing the number of 
workers may improve productivity, making them unhappy (because of reassignment) may 
lead to a decrease in productivity. Only the passage of time will reveal the true result. 
4. Work process 
At the beginning of the transition process, senior managers from CPF, NAVSEA, 
CSP, MIDPAC, PHNSY, and NIMF met to develop a work process transition strategy. 
They reviewed the ship availability process (a combined I and D level look) and identified 
nine major processes which will comprise an availability in the consolidated organization. 
These include Work Package Development, Work Acceptance, Work Induction, ADP 
Systems, Planning, Work Packaging, Execution Management, QA Processes, and Work 
Certification. It is clear that the basic process for CNO Scheduled availabilities will 
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remain essentially the same. Portions of the I-level process will change due to the 
introduction of the Miscellaneous Industrial Management System (MIMS). However, that 
basic process will also remain largely the same. 
Where some differences and difficulties may occur is in the area of the "pace of 
work. " Planning for a regular overhaul (D-Ievel) begins about eighteen months prior to 
the availability. An overhaul can last for up to two years. It is a slow, steady process. 
IMA upkeep on the other hand, is fast-paced and hectic. As described in Chapter II, 
planning for the 200-300 jobs (this does not include the ship force work) that are routinely 
completed in an upkeep starts about thirty days prior to the upkeep. Thirty-five days later 
the ship goes to sea. It will be interesting to see how well each group adapts to the other's 
pace of work. 
With the introduction of MIMS, the I-level component will receive access to the 
Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center (SHAPEC) and its database of TGIs. 
While similar to MRMS' Pre-Planned Job (pPJ) database, SHAPEC's is much more 
extensive. With access to this larger database of work documents, the time required to 
plan an I-level job should decrease. 
One of the major differences between the two work processes (I and D level) is in 
the area of Quality Assurance (QA). The NIMF operates the QA program in accordance 
with the guidance issued in the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM). Depot level 
maintenance activities use the guidance issued in Task Group Instructions (TGIs). In both 
cases the desired result is the same: to ensure the right parts are properly assembled within 
the equipment/system and to ensure the equipment/system is properly tested. Where the 
two differ is in the requirements for documentation and in-process control. The end state 
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goal is to have common, standardized processes and paperwork. To that end, a new QA 
manual, the Quality Program (QP) manual was developed. The new QP manual invokes 
all higher authority source documents and instructions required in the performance of 
maintenance on surface ships and submarines. It is approved for local use in Hawaii as 
part of the pilot program. Additionally, the SHAPEC database of TGIs has included the 
QP manual standard forms in their products. [Ref 8] 
5. Financial Management 
One of the crucial questions regarding the consolidation was the funding issue. 
NIMF is mission funded and PHNSY is working capital funded. An early concern was 
how the two systems would work together in the consolidated organization. With a 
mandate to consolidate maintenance functions, differences in the two financial systems, 
with two major budget claimants, would impede progress. In order for consolidation to 
work as planned, workers and material must be able to be moved around the organization 
to various jobs without regard as to how the financial system would account for it. 
a. Mission funding versus WeF 
It was soon realized that a financial arrangement using both funding 
systems would not work. One system would have to be chosen. CPF wanted to use 
mission funding. That would allow CPF to directly fund management and base support 
costs, as well as all ship maintenance work. PHNSY & IMF AC would continue to 
provide depot services on a reimbursable basis when the funding source was other than 
CPF. OSD, however, was concerned that the reduced cost visibility of mission funding 
would not lend itself to an extensive maintenance organization such as a shipyard. [Ref 8, 
17, & 19] 
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b. CPF buyout 
The question was answered in December 1997 when the OUSD (C) signed 
Program Budget Decision (PBD) 404 approving the use of mission funding for the 
consolidated organization. PHNSY & IMF AC would be direct-funded through CPF using 
the appropriation accounting system known as Standard Reporting and Accounting 
System - Fleet Level (STARS-FL). Under mission funding, PHNSY & IMFAC would 
receive an operating budget funding the entire fiscal year without identification of the 
specific work to be accomplished. [Ref 19] 
6. Management Information Services 
The consolidation will require the merger of two very different information 
systems. The NIMF uses MRMS P-6 for managing maintenance information and ST ARS-
FL for accounting. PHNSY uses a variety of systems that provide detailed personnel and 
material cost information, job planning and scheduling information, material ordering and 
tracking information, and resource management information. One of the keys to the 
success of the consolidation will be how well these different systems communicate with 
one another. PHNSY's Automated Information System (AlS) is composed of two 
components, BAlM and SYMIS. A third component, the Miscellaneous Industrial 
Management System (MIMS) has been added to merge MRMS P-6 and PHNSY's AlS. 
MIMS is the "junior" version of BAlM. It has some but not all of the features of BAlM. 
It is used to track JOs, to perform job planning, and to order material via its own version 
of MR. In the consolidated organization BAlM will be utilized for all CNO scheduled 
availabilities planned for greater than 10,000 mandays, and MIMS will be used for I-level 
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availabilities and CNO scheduled availabilities planned to take less that 10,000 mandays. 
[Ref 8] 
The two key links for the consolidation are to integrate the MRMS P-6 system of 
the NIMF into MlMS, and to allow SYMIS to feed cost information into STARS-FL. 
PBD 404 directs that depot level maintenance maintain the same cost visibility it had while 
it was in the NWCF. To do this, full SYMIS capability must be maintained. However, 
since the consolidated organization will be mission funded and all financial reporting will 
be via STARS-FL, a link between SYMIS and STARS-FL is needed to prevent the need 
for duplicate financial data entry. That link, called the "green box", has been developed 
and is in testing. Figure 3.2 is a simplified diagram of the proposed integration of the I 
and D level MIS. [Ref 8 & 14] 
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Figure 3.2. The integrated PHNSY & IMFAC MIS. [Ref. 8 & 14] 
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7. Observations 
The consolidation ofPHNSY and NIMF is one of the more ambitious maintenance 
consolidations yet taken in the DOD. The consolidation involves over 4000 people in two 
different organizations with a total budget of nearly $420 million. In FY 1997, the two 
separate organizations worked a total of over 640,000 mandays on over forty ships. 
There are many roadblocks ahead for the consolidation. Some of these, systems 
integratio~ personnel integratio~ work process integratio~ and financial integratio~ have 
been briefly discussed. Other roadblocks, unseen at this time, lay ahead for the managers 
and workers at PHNSY & IMF AC. If PHNSY & IMF AC is to continue life as a 
consolidated maintenance facility beyond FY 1999, the Navy must convince the Congress 
that the effort has been successful. In order to do that, PHNSY & IMF AC will require a 
set of metrics that measure how well they have performed the maintenance mission. The 
metrics they have chosen to do this are the focus of the next section. 
D. THE PEARL HARBOR TEST PLAN PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
In PBD 404, the OUSD (C) expressed concern about two issues regarding the 
PHNSY and the NIMF consolidation. They were, the financial cost base line, and how 
success would be measured .. In April 1998, the Naval Audit Service (NAS) completed 
work on the financial cost baseline for FY 1997. The results of this baseline assessment 
will be compared to baseline metrics in FY 1999 and subsequent years. This will be done 
to evaluate whether any savings have been realized from the consolidation. It must be 
remembered, however, that saving money was not the primary reason for the 
consolidation. The focus of the CPFINA VSEA effort is to get more maintenance 
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perfonned per dollar. They will do this by improving process/infrastructure efficiencies 
such that the material condition of CPF ships improves at a faster rate than the money 
spent. 
The second issue gets to the heart of this thesis. How will the success of the 
consolidation be measured? How will we know if it worked? Can the idea be applied to 
other activities? To answer these questions, the Pilot Transition Team (PTT) Metrics 
Subgroup highlighted several areas that could be used as perfonnance measures. They 
proposed five categories for metrics: The first four of the categories are CNO national 
metric areas. The fifth is a miscellaneous category. The five categories are, 
• Cost effectiveness. 
• Overhead reduction. 
• Customer satisfaction. 
• Infrastructure reduction. 
• Miscellaneous measures to track. 
These proposed areas were provided to NA VSEA and the NAS for review. In 
April 1998, NA VSEA issued the completed Financial Cost Baseline and the Pearl Harbor 
Pilot Test Plan. The test plan describes five "assessment metrics." They are: 
• Cost per unit output. 
• Production efficiency and resource utilization. 
• Material readiness. 
• Customer satisfaction. 
• Quality. 
Each of the metrics will be described and, where possible, calculations perfonned 
to show their values. PHNSY financial data from 1996 and 1997 will be used to make the 
51 
calculations. Two years were chosen to highlight trends and to show the variances 
between years. Additionally, 1997 end-of-year CSMP data was used to evaluate the 
material readiness metric. 
1. Cost per unit output 
The metric chosen was "cost per unit output ensuring total cost visibility." This 
will be calculated by dividing the total activity costs (minus certain items) by the 
production shop direct man-hours delivered. The items that will be excluded from the 
total activity costs are included in the top third of Table 3.2 [Ref 35]. 
1996 1997 
Costs of goods/services 375,161,478 298,088,687 
- NWCF surcharges 0 0 
- Dir Reimb Mat 29,357,309 29,255,327 
- Dir Reimb Contract 34,589,056 31,341,480 
- Depreciation 12,188,393 10,546,275 
-MILCONExp 0 0 
- Centrally managed 0 0 
= A. Total costs 299,026,720 226,945,605 
Productive manhours 1,774,342 1,532,484 
Other Productive manhours 834,490 782,655 
B. Total production manhours 2,608,832 2,315,139 
Total cost per Prod manhr (=AIB) $114.62 $98.03 
x 8 hrs/day x 8 hrs/day x 8 hrs/day 
. ~ Totaleo~PetProdnt~iliy "." . "'?~$9:f~~91 i' ········.·)$784al· . 
C. Total labor hrs charged 6,913,385 5,279,300 
Productive manhours 1,774,342 1,532,484 
Other productive manhours 834,490 782,655 
D. Total production manhours 2,608,832 2,315,139 
Production ¢ffiCieney,iatio{::;:bCID) . •.•...•. . ...... , (;T2.()5". '['0' . 2m ••••• ..2.28 . 
Table 3.2. Cost per unit and production efficiency ratios. [Ref. 29 & 35] 
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Table 3.2 shows the results of the cost per unit calculations for FY 1996 
($916.97/manday) and FY 1997 ($784.21/manday) for PHNSY (the NIMF numbers have 
not been included). In calculating a unit cost there are many issues which must be 
discussed and understood. The numbers presented above were calculated using one 
method. There are many other methods that could have been used. In determining the 
financial cost baseline for FY 1997, the NAS will calculate its own rate using slightly 
different cost and labor components than were used here. In any event, the metric will still 
indicate the total cost per unit of production. Since the intent of the consolidation is to 
improve both the maintenance process as well as worker productivity, the total cost per 
unit should decrease. 
2. Production efficiency and resource utilization 
Central to determining the efficacy of the consolidation is a determination of 
whether there has been an increase in productivity. Productivity is the ratio of outputs to 
inputs. Unfortunately, shipyards do not provide a stable output that can be measured with 
precision. Shipyards do not make widgets on an assembly line. They repair ships and 
each ship is different. If the process does not result in a stable output product, how can 
productivity be measured? 
The metric developed to measure this is production efficiency and resource 
utilization. It will be calculated by dividing the total activity "labor man-hours charged" 
(direct and indirect) by the total production shop "direct man-hours delivered." Table 3.2 
shows the calculations for FY 1996 (2.65) and FY 1997 (2.28) for PHNSY (the NIMF 
numbers have not been included). As some supervisors are transitioned to production 
positions, the total number of indirect man-hours should decrease. However, that 
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decrease should be offset by an increase in direct man-hours. The numerator should then 
remain nearly constant. The denominator, as mentioned, will increase since production 
shop direct man-hours will increase. The net result of efforts to increase shipyard 
productivity will decrease the value of this metric. 
3. Material Readiness 
The metric chosen was "CSMP backlog". As previously discussed, the CS:MP is 
the database of the material problems of a ship. Under ideal conditions one can say that 
the fewer the number of CSMP entries (i.e., equipment/system problems), the better the 
material condition of the ship. This leads directly to increased readiness and, therefore, 
improved war-fighting capability. Commanding Officers, TYCOMs, and Fleet 
Commanders routinely gauge the condition of their ships based on the quantity and quality 
of content in their CSMPs. From the ship's point of view (the customer), reducing the 
number of CSMP entries is the only purpose of IMAs and depot maintenance facilities. 
To meet the goal of keeping the CSMP as small as possible, ship crews are continually 
performing maintenance. Whether in a depot or intermediate availability, voyage repair 
period, or simply a ship's force upkeep, corrective and preventive maintenance is always 
being performed. 
Backlogs occur for a number of reasons. Most commonly, there are more material 
problems on the ship than there are maintenance activities to :fix them. Backlog is 
inevitable. Ships undergo three to five week I-level availabilities three to four times a 
year. They und~rgo SRAs (depot maintenance) about every one and a half to three years 
(depending upon the ship class). Regular overhauls occur at the eight to ten year points. 
Even with all of this maintenance time, ships continue to find and report material 
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problems. Material problems screened to depot maintenance periods will probably be 
listed in the CSMP for anywhere from one to three years. That creates backlog. 
Additionally, even during I-level or ship's force upkeep periods, crews find and report 
material problems to be corrected at the next maintenance period. 
The Metrics Subgroup proposes to count the gross number of CSMP entries as 
reported by each ship. This will be done monthly. One of the goals of the consolidation is 
to "level load" the workload. This means that, when the CNO Scheduled Availability 
workload is greater than depot capacity, I-level technicians can fill the gaps. Conversely, 
when depot capacity is greater than Intermediate scheduled work, depot technicians can 
work at the I-level reducing the CSMP backlog. One measure of the success of the 
consolidation would be a reduction in the number of backlogged CSMP entries. 
As of December 31, 1997, Pearl Harbor based surface ships had an average 
backlog of530 jobs per ship, while the submarines had an average backlog of390 jobs per 
ship. [Ref 20] 
4. Customer Satisfaction 
This metric category is focused on the customer's perspective. From the ship's 
point of view, it wants a maintenance activity (I or D level) to provide work that is (1) of 
high quality and (2) on schedule. As one moves up the chain of command a third element 
is added: (3) low cost. NA VSEA states that these elements, quality, schedule, and cost 
are the "cornerstone" of its business policy. The customer satisfaction metric should, 
therefore, seek to address at least one of the customer's wants. 
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This metric area will be composed of a schedule adherence measure. The measure 
will track how early or late a ship is coming out of an I or D level availability. This is not 
a new metric. Both PHNSY and NIMF track this metric. 
5. Quality 
The quality metric will be measured by customer surveys. To quote the Pilot Test 
Plan [Ref 35]: 
Naval shipyards have a proven record of quality output in both nuclear and 
non-nuclear work. This is the result of stringent technical control, 
extensive technical documentation for all work, work process requirements 
and exhaustive equipment testing. The most comprehensive measure of 
overall quality is product reliability and operability, which is best gauged by 
the customer through formal customer feedback. 
6. Observations 
The consolidation makes sense only if it improves the material condition and 
therefore the war-fighting capability of the fleet while maintaining or reducing the price 
tag. One question may be; how can we measure the capacity of the organization to 
perform more maintenance? Or, more importantly, will the capacity added through 
consolidation actually result in more maintenance performed? This question forces us to 
look not only at the internal "busy-ness" measures but also at metrics that measure outputs 
and outcomes. The "busy-ness" areas are important. The public demands that resources 
are used efficiently and input/inter-activity metrics can be useful in measuring this. 
However, they must be used in concert with metrics that measure the result we really 
want: more maintenance output per dollar spent. The old adage, "you get what you 
measure," is as true at a NSY as it is anywhere else. 
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Reviewing the proposed metrics reveals that they can be segregated into two 
categories: customer satisfaction measures and "surrogate" productivity measures. As 
mentioned earlier, productivity is the ratio of outputs to inputs. Since the output of a 
NSY is difficult to define and measure, so to will be the productivity metrics. The 
productivity metrics proposed then, are surrogates for true productivity measures. 
Additionally, material readiness is really a customer satisfaction measure. If the ship is not 
ready for war due to a material problem the entire chain of command is not happy 
(satisfied). In the customer satisfaction category belong esMP backlog, schedule 
adherence and quality. In the (surrogate) productivity category belong cost per unit and 
production efficiency and resource utilization. The five proposed metrics are excellent 
performance measures. That said, there are two concerns: 
• In order for the esMP backlog to be a useful measure, both the ship and its 
ISle must work vigorously to ensure the eSMP is as accurate as possible. 
• In order for the quality metric to be useful, a system must be in place to 
actually "do" something with the surveys. The customer must believe that the 
comments will be acted upon and not just acknowledged and filed away. 
The next chapter will examine various other measures within a framework that is 
used in some very successful private businesses. 
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IV. PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
A. WHY MEASURE PERFORMANCE? 
We measure performance for a variety of reasons. The most important of these 
should be to determine if the organization's goals and objectives are being met. This 
requires that the organization have a set of goals and objectives. Business literature is 
replete with case studies and information regarding the importance of developing and 
implementing strategic plans to guide the organization. These ideas are finding their way 
into the public sector as well. The GPRA requires that federal agencies submit, by FY 
1999, strategic plans that answer these basic questions: What is our mission? What are our 
goals and how will we achieve them? How can we measure our performance? How will 
we use that information to make improvements? [Ref. 23] The strategic plan is at the 
heart of what the organization is all about. Once the plan is in place, a performance 
measurement system (PMS) [Ref 24] is developed to track adherence to the plan. The 
typical PMS seeks to answer three questions: 
• Are we implementing our strategic plan? 
• Are we meeting our goals and objectives? 
• Are we improving? 
To help federal managers through the process of developing and implementing a 
strategic management plan, the GAO has provided guidance containing key steps and 
critical practices that can be used to formulate a strategic plan. Figure 4.1 briefly 
describes the process espoused by the GAO. The three steps are; define the mission, 
measure performance, and use the performance information. 
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Step 3: 




Define the mission and desired outcomes 
Practices: 
1. Involve stakeholders 
2. Assess environment 







1. Produce measures at each 
organizational level that 
- demonstrate results, 
- are limited to the vital few, 
- respond to multiple 
priorities, and 1. Identify performance gaps 
- link to responsible programs 
2. Collect data 
2. Report information 
3. Use information 
Figure 4.1. GPRA Key Steps and Critical Practices [Ref. 23] 
B. DEFINING THE MISSION AND DESIRED OUTCOMES 
The strategic plan is at the heart of the PMS. The PMS tracks adherence to the 
strategic plan. With no strategic plan there is little value in a PMS. The strategic plan 
involves not only the organization's mission statement but also its goals. It describes what 
the organization does, why it is in business, and who the customer is. It should also 
contain a road map for implementing the plan. The strategic plan is not a static document 
kept on the CEO's shelf, but rather a dynamic action plan which is continually reviewed 
and updated as conditions, both internal and external, warrant. 
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The process of developing a strategic plan, if done correctly, is not easy. A key 
factor in the strategic plan is input from stakeholders. Stakeholders are people, either 
internal or external to the organization, who have an interest in what the organization 
does. In the public sector this can potentially involve groups as diverse as the Congress, 
the Executive, various federal agencies as well as many "regular" citizens. Indeed, the 
public sector organization in particular has a very difficult task ahead in the formulation of 
agency direction in light of the many inputs that can be brought to the floor. Nevertheless, 
all organizations need a well-formulated statement of mission, or purpose, and a clear plan 
to achieve that purpose. The strategic plan fulfills that need. 
In addition to the organization's purpose, the strategic plan must provide goals that 
define the desired outcomes. These goals should be achievable and measurable. Most 
importantly, they must support the mission of the organization and directly impact the 
output product or service. The question is, do the stated goals take into account what the 
customer (stakeholder) really wants? If the organization's goals and ideas of output are 
not in congruence with the stakeholders' ideas, the door is open for one or the other of the 
parties to be sorely disappointed by the outcome. 
The next step requires that a framework, or road map, be presented to explain how 
the organization will achieve the goals of the strategic plan. This road map does not 
provide the exact course to be laid out, but instead provides guidance regarding how the 
organization intends to satisfy the goals and objectives. 
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C. MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
The process of developing a strategic plan is difficult and time consuming. The 
most difficult part of the process may well be that of determining what performance 
metrics best capture the essence of the goals and desired outcomes. The old adage in 
management literature is "you get what you measure, so you had better measure what you 
want". Too often outcome A is desired, but managers and employees are rewarded for 
outcome B. Not surprisingly, outcome B is the result. Additionally, for many federal 
agencies, the output of the process is not clear. For example, what is the DOD's output? 
What metrics can be used to measure the performance of the DOD? Or the U.S. Forest 
Service, or Health, Education, and Welfare? Achieving common agreement on the goals 
of these agencies will be difficult enough; never mind the process of developing 
performance measures. GPRA requires that agencies provide for maximum stakeholder 
involvement in the development of their strategic plans. In the political environment that 
public agencies operate this is a very tall order indeed. Further, GPRA states that the 
Congress will be the final arbiter of agency disagreements regarding missions, goals, and 
outcomes. Again, in the public arena achieving "goal congruence" among the many 
stakeholders (i.e., the public) involved will be a long and arduous process. However, this 
must be done. 
1. Definitions 
Two types of measures must be defined. These are "outcome measures" and 
"driver measures". Outcome measures include areas such as customer satisfaction, 
profitability (budget adherence in the public sector), and employee skills. Outcome 
measures are lag indicators. This means that the process is complete by the time the 
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organization knows the results of the measure. Driver measures are lead indicators in that 
they provide measurement feedback during the process. These measures include areas 
such as defect rates, rework rates, and cycle time. Outcome or driver measures by 
themselves do not tell the whole story. A PMS must have a balance between these two 
types of measures to be effective. [Ref 26] 
Additionally, measures may be objective or subjective. In general, most managers 
and employees prefer objective measures. With these measures the goal is clear. 
Determining whether or not the goal was attained is also clear. Objective measures are 
usually easier to develop. Subjective measures on the other hand are more difficult to 
develop and use. Rather than a definitive yes or no, these measures are of the "gut feel" 
variety. Subjective measures lend themselves to questions regarding their viability, 
accuracy, and importance. Sometimes, however, a subjective gut feel is the only way to 
measure certain aspects of a process. 
2. Key Attributes 
In his book, Levers of Control, Robert Simmons describes four "control systems" 
that are evident in organizations. One of these, the diagnostic control system, is a 
feedback system that Simmons describes as "the backbone of traditional management 
control. .. designed to ensure predictable goal achievement". The concept is that for an 
organization to succeed it must be able to measure the output of its process, compare its 
output to industry standards, and then correct deviations from those standards [Ref 25]. 
Most business organizations do this in the form of business plans, goals/objective systems, 
and budgets. Because of the GPRA, public sector organizations are now required to work 
though thi~ process as well. 
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Managers must look very hard at the metrics they are developing to measure 
performance. For the measures to be effective in satisfying the strategic plan they must be 
"complete", be within the manager's ability to change, and must provide incentives for 
both the managers and the employees. A "complete measure" is one that accurately 
captures the essence of the desired goal or outcome. [Ref 25] 
For example, if the goal of an organization is to provide well maintained, 
modernized ships to protect the country, should the organization measure its cost 
structure or the readiness of the ships or both? One could argue that, by selecting 
incomplete measures, measures that do not fully capture the essence of the organization's 
goal, dysfunctional behavior within the organization might occur. The measures should be 
within the manager's ability to controL The manager must control the process that the 
metric measures. Ifhe or she does not control the process but is held accountable for the 
measurement results, frustration and poor performance can occur. Tied to this are 
incentives. 
One could argue that managers and employees perform the tasks that keep them 
out of trouble with their bosses or that are tied to their performance evaluation systems 
(and therefore to their financial well-being). In the private sector, incentives are usually 
financial. In the public sector they are a little more difficult to define. Certainly, by giving 
a manager/employee an outstanding performance evaluation there exists the potential for 
financial compensation via advancement or promotion. However, most of the incentives 
are in the form of time-off, citations/awards (in some case these can be financial), or a "pat 
on the back". Whatever form they take, incentives are a key area that must be examined 
during the process of developing perfonp.ance measures. 
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3. Financial and non-financial measures 
Until recently, most businesses relied on financial information to measure 
performance. Accounting data is easy to archive, retrieve, and measure. Within the last 
ten years, however, there has been a push to include non-financial information as a source 
for measurement. This has come about due to an increased awareness of the needs of the 
customer. Customer satisfaction measures came to prominence after American businesses 
were caught flat-footed by Japanese business' focus on manufacturing high quality 
products for American markets. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, Japanese industry 
secured a firm foothold in American market share. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
the auto industry. Japanese automobiles went from being cheap, low-tech, low-quality 
commodities to expensive, high-tech, high-quality status symbols. This occurred over 
about fifteen years. The miraculous turnaround came as a result of Japanese industry 
listening to their customers. As automobile prices increased and as technology improved, 
customers began to take issue with the quality problems of their cars. Japanese industry 
instituted "total quality" process improvement and, using non-financial measures in 
conjunction with financial measures, charted a strategic course that nearly devastated the 
American automobile industry. Today Japanese automobile manufacturers are as 
dominant as our own. 
4. Application 
No single measure or category of measures will suffice. There must be a mix of 
driver/outcome measures, objective/subjective measures, and financial/non-financial 
measures to tell the complete story of the organization's success in realizing the strategic 
plan. Within this framework, the non-financial metric has become more important as a 
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measure of organizational success. So the question is, how can we meld financial and 
non-financial metrics into a PMS that is focused on achieving the strategic plan? There 
are many strategic measuring systems discussed in business management textbooks. This 
thesis will examine one of them, the Balanced Scorecard, which is discussed below. 
D. THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) is a management system that incorporates a 
strategic plan and a robust PMS [Ref 26]. The idea is to design performance measures 
that work toward the goals and objectives of the strategic plan. Translating the plan into 
workable measures is difficult. It requires that managers have an intimate understanding 
of their customers, their processes, and their outputs so they can choose the most effective 
measures of the processes' performance. As its name implies, the Balanced Score Card 
seeks to achieve a balance between the different categories of measures: outcome and 
driver measures, objective and subjective measures, and financial and non-financial 
measures. 
The BSC seeks measures that are in congruence with the desired goals and 
objectives of the strategic plan. The goals must set targets that are high enough to be 
challenging yet also be achievable. There must also be short, intermediate, and long-term 
targets. Each successive level of management has a different time horizon. Senior 
management (e.g., a Shipyard Commander) usually has a very long time horizon of 
interest. The group leader of a small project in one division (e.g., a production shop 
supervisor) of a large company, will probable have a very short time horizon of interest. 
The PMS must capture the different qualities of the time horizon component. The 
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....------------------------------------------------
measures senior management reviews will probably not be the same measures that a shop 
foreman reviews. However, all of the measures must work toward achieving the goals 
and objectives of the strategic plan. 
The goals must have a standard against which they can be measured. This 
standard is called a "benchmark". We measure performance to determine how well we are 
doing. Most businesses are interested in increasing shareholder value. To do that they 
must improve "the bottom line" of their income statements, their earnings per share (EPS). 
That is accomplished by changing the cost structure of' the company and by increasing 
market share. Changing the cost structure requires a focus on financial information as 
well as the internal business process. Increasing market share requires a focus on the 
customer's needs and the company's ability to innovate and learn new processes. Effective 
performance measures capture all four of these focus areas. Once the measures are 
chosen and implemented, the next step is to compare them against the benchmark 
measures. 
The most effective benclunarks are those of the leaders in the particular market. 
For instance, Microsoft may be an excellent source of benclunarks for a firm in the 
software business, GE for a widely diversified set of businesses. Performance measures 
alone do not tell managers how well the company's strategic plan is achieving their goals. 
While they can provide information regarding areas requiring improvement, to be truly 
effective in increasing shareholder value, they must be referenced to benclunarks of 
excellent performance. 
The BSC defines four "perspectives" that are used to achieve the balance required 
of strategically effective performance measures. These are, the financial, the customer, the 
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internal business, and the innovation and learning perspectives. Figure 4.2 outlines the 
system described by Norton and Kaplan. Each of the perspectives will be discussed in its 
generic form and then applied to the specific case ofPHNSY & IMF AC. 
How do our 
customers see us? 
Customer Perspective 
To achieve our vision, how should 






To succeed financially, how should 







Innovation and Learning 
Perspective 
To achieve our Vision, now will we 






How do we look 
to the stakeholders? 
l/IIhat must we 
excel at internally? 
Internal Business Perspective 
To satisfy our shareholders and 
customers, what business 





How do we leam and 
innovate to create 
the future? 
Figure 4.2. The Balanced Scorecard [Ref. 26] 
1. The Financial Perspective 
The financial perspective encompasses the traditional metrics used to measure 
performance. Included in these measures are the profitability ratios, liquidity ratios, asset 
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management ratios, debt management ratios, and market value ratios [Ref 27]. Two 
additional concepts are "market value added," and "economic value added." The ratios 
and concepts are targeted at answering the fundamental financial question every business 
has: is our strategic plan improving our bottom line and therefore our shareholder value? 
a. Liquidity Ratios 
Liquidity Ratios examine the company's ability to pay short-term 
obligations. The two ratios used are the current ratio (current assets divided by current 
liabilities) and the Quick, or acid test, ratio (current assets minus inventories divided by 
current liabilities). 
b. Asset Management Ratios 
Asset Management Ratios measure how effectively the firm is managing its 
assets. The ratios used are inventory turnover (cost of sales divided by inventories), days 
sales outstanding (receivables divided by average sales per day), fixed asset turnover (sales 
divided by net fixed assets), and total assets turnover (sales divided by total assets). 
c. Debt Management Ratios 
Debt Management Ratios measure the extent to which the firm uses debt 
(vice equity, i.e., stocks) to finance assets and operations. These ratios include the debt 
ratio (total debt divided by total assets), the times-interest-earned ratio (earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest charges), and the fixed charge coverage ratio 
(EBIT plus lease payments divided by the sum of interest charges, lease payments, and 
sinking fund payments adjusted for taxes). 
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d Profitability Ratios 
Profitability Ratios show the combined effects of liquidity, asset 
management, and debt management on operating results. Ratios include profit margin on 
sales (net income available to common stockholders divided by sales), basic earning power 
(EBIT divided by total assets), return on total assets (net income available to common 
stockholders divided by total assets), and return on common equity (net income available 
to common stockholders divided by common equity). 
e. Market Value Ratios 
Market Value Ratios relate the firm's stock price to its earnings and book 
value. Ratios include price to earnings (price per share divided by earnings per share), 
market to book (price per share divided by book value per share - where book value is 
common equity (including retained earnings) divided by shares outstanding). 
f Market Value Added 
Market Value Added (MVA) is an attempt to measure the firm's value 
added to the stakeholder. It is the market value of equity (shares outstanding times price 
per share) minus the total equity capital supplied by stakeholders. This is a long-term 
measure of value added for the shareholder, starting from the firm's first public equity 
offering. The greater the difference, the more value the firm has added to the stakeholder's 
investment. 
g. Economic Value Added 
Economic Value Added (EVA) seeks to evaluate management's 
effectiveness in a given year. It is calculated by subtracting the cost of all capital (total 
capital supplied times the weighted average cost of capital) from operating profits after 
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taxes (sales minus operating costs minus taxes). Again, the higher the EVA the more 
effective were the managers in operating the firm for the stakeholders. 
In practice these ratios are more complex to apply than their definitions imply. 
Accounting issues such as inventory valuation methods, depreciation and amortization, 
and lease financing can create numerical differences in the ratios of firms where no 
practical difference exists [Ref 27]. 
2. The Customer Perspective 
As its name implies, the focus of this perspective is on customer related issues. In 
the private sector, financial performance is the dominant driver. To achieve the desired 
level of financial performance (i.e., increase shareholder value) the business must attract, 
satisfy, and retain customers. The customer perspective is an external focus on the core 
competencies that the business must improve to attract and retain customers. In the last 
ten years there has been increasing emphasis on the wants and needs of customers. 
The public sector is budget driven rather than profit driven. With a few 
exceptions, public agencies are usually the sole issuer of the goods or services they 
provide. This has engendered, in some agencies, a monopolistic attitude. As a result there 
has been less attention paid to the wants and needs of the customer. The GPRA attempts 
to get public agencies to focus on their customers' needs. Customer acquisition and 
retention may not be issues for many public sector organizations, since they are 
monopolies. However, customer satisfaction and customer profitability (via reduced cost 
operations) are. 
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Regardless of the sector of operation, the organization must develop metrics that 
effectively measure core competencies that affect the customer's needs. Examples of the 
customer focus areas include: [Ref 26] 
a. Market Share 
While market share is a major indicator for private sector firms, little 
attention has been paid to it by public agencies. As previously noted, in many instances 
the public agency has a virtual monopoly on the particular good or service it provides. 
However, in some areas, such as government communications, some public agencies are in 
competition to provide services. Certain measures provide excellent information 
regarding the success or failure of the agency's initiatives to increase market share. 
Market share measures require intimate understanding of not only the customer but also 
the competition. While data for these measures are not necessarily easy to obtain, the 
payoffis the knowledge of how well a business is faring against the competition. 
h. Customer Retention 
This measure can be as simple as identifying who the customers are and 
tracking their patronage from period to period. Another method is to measure growth of 
the business resulting from returning customers. 
c. Customer Acquisition 
Measures the numbers of new customers or the percentage of total sales 
attributable to new customers. 
d Customer Satisfaction 
This area cannot be emphasized too much. There is a wealth of data that 
demonstrates how much customer satisfaction affects the customer's decision to continue 
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doing business with an organization. A customer survey is an excellent method to 
measure customer satisfaction. Indeed, it is the most common method. The process of 
generating, issuing, and evaluating customer satisfaction surveys is difficult and time 
consuming and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Generally, private sector organizations 
out source this function to service companies that specialize in this area. 
e. Customer Profitability 
Not all customers are equally profitable. Businesses must determine which 
customers provide the greatest profit, and re-think the plan for the rest of the customers. 
It may be in the business' best interest to drop high cost customers. Obviously, in the 
public sector this is usually not an option. However, measures that provide management 
with a picture of the profitability of each customer are very useful, if only for knowing on 
whom to spend the most time. Activity-based-costing is an excellent example of an 
accounting process that can provide a wealth of information on customer profitability. 
Data for these areas are not always easy to obtain. However once the decision is 
made to use measures such as these, the data gathering systems can be put in place. The 
payoff comes later when managers find that they have more information with which to 
make decisions regarding organization issues. 
In addition to the five areas discussed above, it must be remembered that a good 
image/reputation, a strong customer relationship, and good product/service functionality 
are key measures of the customer perspective. To that end, there are several measures of 
core competencies that can be utilized to evaluate how well the organization is satisfying 
the customer's needs. [Ref 26] 
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f. Time 
The customer values on-time delivery and lead time very highly. Metrics 
that describe the essence of these two areas are excellent performance measures. The 
measures work at many different levels within the organization. Product/service 
throughput timing metrics, as well as end result timing metrics, can be utilized throughout 
the organization. Each shop, division, and department can use timing measures. 
g. Quality 
The customer values product/service quality very highly. Examples of 
quality metrics include defect rates, product return rates, warranty claims rates, and field 
service call rates. Some businesses set up entire departments to measure and track the 
quality perspective. That may not be appropriate for all organizations. However, 
customer satisfaction often hinges on quality; so, somebody had better be tracking it. 
h. Price 
This is a very important customer consideration. Product/service price is at 
the heart of competition. The customer is always concerned with price. Pricing is a study 
in itself Prices that are too high drive customers away, lower profits and make 
shareholders unhappy. Prices that are too low may bring in customers but may also 
reduce profitability if volume does not make up the difference. Careful study of the 
market is required prior to establishing prices. In the public sector prices should cover 
costs. Managers, therefore, must have accurate knowledge of their cost structures prior 
to setting prices. 
The business that can deliver quality goods/services, on time and at the right price, 
while simultaneously maintaining strong customer relationships, will dominate its market. 
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This same philosophy holds true in the public sector. Any efforts to improve those four 
attributes will surely improve the effectiveness of government. 
3. The Internal-Business-Process Perspective 
This perspective looks at the internal business processes that are most important in 
achieving the goals of increasing shareholder value. As discussed above, we know that to 
increase value the business must ultimately increase customer satisfaction. Senior 
managers must understand which of their internal business processes ultimately increase 
customer satisfaction. This requires a thorough evaluation of the overall business process. 
The measures developed by management must highlight those areas that improve the 
"integrated business process" and not just a particular department or segment of the 
organization [Ref. 26]. Figure 4.3 provides a generalized value chain for a business. The 
internal business process perspective focuses on the innovation process, the operations 
























Figure 4.3. The generalized value chain. [Ref. 26] 
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a. Innovation process 
This process identifies the customer's needs then creates a product or 
service to meet those needs. This is a critical process. The longer the design/development 
time, the more important the innovation process becomes in value chain analysis. The 
traditional emphasis is usually on the operations process. That is where the product is 
actually produced. Conventional wisdom believes that, since the operations process is 
where the majority of the direct labor and material costs are, most of the cost cutting and 
performance measurement initiatives need to be in that process. However in many cases, 
the innovation process is at least as long if not longer than the operations process. 
Additionally, it is in the innovation process that most of the costs of the operations 
process are built in. The more thorough a job the innovation process performs the more 
smoothly the operations process runs. With this in mind, we can now understand why 
managers must spend more time examining the innovation process. [Ref 26] 
A NSY does not create new products and services. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis it is assumed that the planning effort that starts prior to the actual 
availability is part of an "innovation cycle." As in the private sector example, the more 
thorough the planning effort, the more smoothly the availability proceeds. 
h. Operations process 
This is the process where the production work is accomplished. It is here 
that the product or service is built and delivered to the customer. As previously discussed, 
this is the process that is usually studied the most, looking for cost savings. 
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c. Post-sale service process 
This process is concerned with servicing the customer. Once again we see 
the importance to the value chain in taking care of the customer. This process, if correctly 
carried out, can go a long way towards building customer satisfaction and loyalty. Of 
course, if the post-sale service is as a result of warranty claims and repair work, then 
clearly that will not make the customer too happy. Hopefully, the innovation process 
designed a high quality product and the operations process built the product to the same 
high standards. Post-sale service feedback can provide an excellent source of information 
regarding the previous two processes. 
The two metrics usually used in the internal business process evaluation are cycle-
time and first pass yield. 
d. Cycle-time 
The traditional measure of cycle-time was originally developed for the 
operations process of manufacturing. It is called Manufacturing Cycle Effectiveness 
(MCE). MCE is processing time divided by throughput time. Throughput time is defined 
as the sum of processing time, inspection time, movement time, and waiting/storage time. 
While developed for manufacturing, the idea is easily converted to any of the internal 
business processes. A NSY example will illustrate an innovation process application. 
Throughput time is the sum of contracting time plus planning time plus review/approval 
time plus any waiting time. MCE would be planning time divided by throughput time. 
For the post-sale service process cycle-time could be the time from the initial customer 
call for service to the time the service action is completed. With a little imagination, a 
variety of measures can be developed around the cycle-time theme. Of course the 
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manager must be careful in the conclusions drawn from the numbers the measures provide. 
For example, each product development cycle is different because each product is 
different. Therefore each application of cycle-time should be separately evaluated. In 
some cases different cycle-times can be compared and sometimes they cannot. [Ref 26] 
e. First pass yield 
This is a quality measure. As with cycle-time it can be applied to any of the 
internal business processes. For instance, in the innovation process it could be work 
package rejection rate; in the operation process, the job rework rate; and for the post-sale 
service process, it could be the number of times service must be performed before the 
customer is satisfied. Again, with a little imagination many specific measures can be 
developed. [Ref 26] 
Performance measures for the internal business perspective are best determined by 
the people in the business. While a generic discussion of cycle time and first pass yiel.d 
makes the process sound easy, in practice is will be very difficult. Obtaining agreement on 
the components to be used in these measures can be as difficult as obtaining the data with 
which to measure. 
4. The Learning and Growth Perspective 
The organization must have the ability to learn and grow if it is to meet the targets 
set in the financial, customer, and internal business process perspectives. As Norton and 
Kaplan state, "the enablers for learning and growth come primarily from three sources: 
employees, systems, and organizational alignment." This perspective requires "significant 
investments in people, systems, and processes that build organizational capabilities." [Ref 
26] 
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Past benchmarks soon become tomorrow's baselines. New process innovation 
must come from those who are the closest to the process. These are generally the front 
line employees and supervisors. To be effective innovators requires that these people be 
re-trained so that they can see how their part in the process fits in to the organization's 
overall objectives. Additionally, an environment must be created at all levels that allow 
past lessons to be remembered and incorporated into the development of future processes. 
Three "core employee measures" are usually used to define this perspective. They 
are employee satisfaction, employee retention, and employee productivity. 
a. Employee Satisfaction 
Unhappy workers are not productive workers. This metric seeks to 
determine the level of worker satisfaction and therefore their capacity for productive 
work. It is usually measured with surveys. As with the customer satisfaction surveys, the 
development and implementation of a survey is a science in itself Care is required in the 
formulation of questions, the way in which the survey is administered, the analysis of data, 
and the publication of the results. In the private sector there are many companies that 
specialize in performing surveys for businesses. 
h. Employee Retention 
The loss of skilled employees is a loss of intellectual capital. It is in the 
company's best interest to keep those people in whom a lot has been invested. This 
measure can help management track the trend. The usual metric is calculated as a 
percentage of total employees or as key staff turnover. 
79 
c. Employee Productivity 
This is an important measure as it supports the employee satisfaction 
metric. Employee productivity is often measured as a ratio of revenue to employees. As 
with any ratio, its measure can be affected by changing either the numerator or 
denominator. Improving productivity can be shown by increasing revenue relative to the 
number of employees or by reducing the number of employees while holding revenue 
constant. One or both of the methods may suit the organization's (and shareholder's) 
purpose. Senior management must closely examine the ratio's components and ensure that 
the incentive system is not affecting the components in a manner that is detrimental to the 
goal of increasing shareholder value. Along the same lines, cost per production manday is 
also an employee productivity measure. 
E. SUMMARY 
A strategic plan is a vital component to any organization's makeup. There must be 
a guiding vision along with measurable goals and objectives. A key part to the strategic 
plan is a performance measurement system that can determine whether the goals and 
objectives are being achieved. Regardless of the measures, leading, lagging, objective, 
subjective, internal, external, financial, or non-financial, managers must have a system in 
place to track the performance of their organizations. This chapter provided an example 
of a framework for a performance measurement system. That system is called the 
"Balanced Scorecard." The BSC is a very popular performance measurement system in 
the private business community. 
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Four "perspectives" are used to group similar measures. Those perspectives are 
the financial perspective, the customer perspective, the internal business perspective, and 
the learning and growth perspective. Within each of these perspectives a set of practical 
measures are defined and developed. Although the measures are generic, they can be 
easily (in some cases) tailored to the exact needs of a specific organization. The BSC will 
now be applied to the metrics proposed by NA VSEA and the NAS to see if they fit into 
the framework. Where holes exist, a search will be conducted for other measures to fill in 
the gaps to achieve more balance. 
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V. PHNSY & IMFAC AND mE BALANCED SCORECARD 
Chapter III provided a detailed examination of the performance measures 
proposed in the NA VSEA's Pearl Harbor Pilot Test Plan. NA VSEA commissioned the 
Naval Audit Service (NAS) to review and formalize those measures so that they can be 
presented to OSD, OMB, and the Congress. Additionally, the NAS was tasked with 
developing the financial cost baseline of the two separate organizations (pHNSY and 
NIMF) for FY 1997. The five metrics that were chosen were evaluated as excellent 
measures on which to base decisions regarding the future of PHNSY & IMF AC. 
However, there may be other metrics that can be applied to further enhance the quality of 
information used to make future decisions. 
Measuring the output of a NSY is not easy. Unlike a manufacturing plant making 
widgets, NSYs repair and modernize ships. Each ship is different and therefore each 
project work package is different. A work item to overhaul a pump on one ship can 
involve much more work than the same pump on another ship of the same class. There is 
no standard overhaul work package. There are standard preventive maintenance work 
items to accomplish on each ship, depending on the age of the ship. However, each ship's 
corrective maintenance work package and modernization work package are different. 
This makes it very difficult to develop outcome measures of effectiveness. However some 
progress in this area has been made. 
The intent of this thesis is to evaluate the performance measures that have been 
developed for implementation at PHNSY & IMF AC. To evaluate these measures 
effectively, the PHNSY & IMF AC strategic plan must also be examined. Remember that 
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an organization must accurately define its purpose, direction, and goals. Only after that 
has been accomplished should performance measures be developed. The measures 
support attainment of the strategy. 
At the time of this writing, PHNSY & IMFAC management had not yet completed 
work on their strategic plan. An executive steering committee comprised of senior 
leadership at PHNSY & IMF AC is currently working on the strategic plan. It is scheduled 
for completion in August 1998. However, NAVSEA 072 (NSY Business Operations) 
does have a strategic plan for the NSY s. Since NA VSEA will retain operational control 
over PHNSY & IMF AC, it is likely that the strategic plan will pertain to PHNSY & 
IMF AC as well as the other three NSY s. In any event, the NA VSEA plan was very well 
written and provided clear direction. Its implementation in 1995 provided a significant 
shift in how NSY s viewed themselves and their customers. The content of the plan 
directly affects the situation in Pearl Harbor. 
In August 1995, NAVSEA 07 issued a document called "Business Policy and 
Guidance for Naval Shipyards" (The Policy). This document effectively acts as the 
overriding business policy of each of the NSY s. A close examination reveals that it is 
actually a strategic plan for the NSY s. It provides the basic information found in a 
strategic plan: the purpose of the NSY s, a description of their customers, and the goals 
and objectives ofNSY operations. The central policy is: [Ref 21] 
Our corporate business policy is to simultaneously deliver cost, quality, and 
schedule performance to our customers (as judged by them) while 
maintaining shipyard and corporate financial solvency. 
The Policy further defines the specific performance attributes necessary to ensure 
the success of the central policy. The central policy is divided into two parts. The first 
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comprises cost, quality and schedule. The second involves shipyard and corporate 
financial performance. Each variable in the first part of the central policy is defined below 
exactly as contained in The Policy [Ref 21]. 
• Cost performance: Price all work fairly as benchmarked against best 
practices of similar work performed in either private or naval shipyards. 
Deliver ships at or below initial sales estimates. Eliminate 'surprise' 
price increases to the customers. 
• Schedule performance: Deliver ships on or ahead of schedule as initially 
agreed with the customer -- the CNO schedule at the start of the 
availability . 
• Quality performance: We must work closely with customers to 
determine their actual needs, requirements, and affordability. We will 
then meet those needs by performing quality work, but not increase the 
cost or schedule by unnecessarily exceeding requirements or 
performing more than the agreed upon work. 
The second part of the central policy, shipyard and financial performance, is 
described in more general terms. The Policy states that long range financial plans will be 
established for each shipyard and the corporation. Additionally, it states: [Ref 21] 
We will create financial indicators appropriate to every level and function 
in the corporation and regularly use them to monitor performance, identifY 
variances and causes, and ensure that corrective actions are taken; and, we 
will make sound business decisions. 
The Policy then states twelve business rules that "provide the structure necessary 
to successfully carry out the business policy and ultimately achieve business success." 
However, six of the business rules will be singled out as they serve the greater purpose of 
the discussion regarding measures, incentives, and their congruence with the desired 
outcome. These rules are: 
• Long-range financial plans will be developed and maintained for each 
shipyard and the corporation. 
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• Financial indicators ... will be established and regularly used to monitor 
performance ... and ensure that corrective actions are taken. 
• Financial performance will be a crucial success indicator at every 
managerial level of the corporation. 
• Shipyard performance within approved budgets is mandatory. 
• Financial performance will be regularly reviewed and discussed by 
shipyard commanders in joint session with their senior shipyard 
managers. 
• Internal Control Practices (ICPs), sales estimates, and fixed price offers 
will be benchmarked against the best performance achieved for like 
work on other availabilities with the corporation or in private shipyards. 
It is obvious that financial performance is an important part of NA VSEA's 
strategic plan for the NSY s. Of the six business rules that were not listed, one was 
financial, one involved ensuring budgets included provisions for workforce training and 
maintenance of real property, three discussed the systems to be used to budget and 
progress work and plan personnel workloads, and one discussed the need to coordinate 
frequently with the customer. 
Following the business rules there is a discussion of the business practices. 
Business practices support and generally expand on the business rules. As with the 
business rules, the practices focus primarily on the financial perspective. One of the 
practices even states, "financial performance is to be included as a factor for each 
manager's yearly performance evaluation. " 
It is important for an organization as large as a shipyard to track financial 
performance. The Policy seems to emphasize that financial performance is the single most 
important element of the strategic plan. Remember that the business policy of the NSY is 
"to simultaneously deliver cost, quality, and schedule performance to our customers." 
Certainly cost is well represented in the strategic plan. But quality and schedule are 
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mentioned only briefly in general terms. Which of these goals do our current performance 
measures support? The policy states that a manager's performance is measured against his 
or her ability to keep costs within budget. It would appear that internal shipyard activities 
aimed at controlling costs have a high priority. 
A. BENCHMARKING 
In the research for this thesis no formally recognized benchmarks could be found 
to evaluate PHNSY & IMF AC performance measures. While not the thrust of this thesis, 
the concept of benchmarks is vital in the development, usage, and especially the analysis of 
performance measures. The Policy states that benchmarks will be used to evaluate NSY 
performance measures. However, benchmarking data on NSY performance were not 
found. This resulted in the development of a partial set of benchmark data culled together 
from private and public shipyard information that was readily available. The process will 
be briefly described. 
There are nearly one hundred private shipyards in this country. Of these the "big-
six" comprise the greatest proportion of revenue and more than 98% of the Navy's 
shipbuilding budget. These are Avondale Industries Incorporated, Bath Iron Works 
Corporation, Electric Boat Corporation (EB), Ingalls Shipbuilding, National Steel & 
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), and Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS). Of these 
only NNS and Avondale are independent, publicly traded companies for whom financial 
data is easily obtained. Bath and EB are subsidiaries of General Dynamics Corporation, 
Ingalls is a subsidiary of Litton Industries Incorporated, and NASSCO is employee owned 
(independent, but not publicly traded). 
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Financial information from these private shipyards was used in an attempt to create 
a picture of the "industry" in which the four public shipyards operate. Since some of the 
financial data was difficult to obtain for the subsidiary companies, financial data from the 
number seven and eight shipyards, Halter Marine Group (Halter) and Todd Shipbuilding 
were also used. Figure 5.1 shows the relative size ofPHNSY in comparison to the private 
yards evaluated. PHNSY is roughly one-fifth the size of the largest shipyard and more 
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Figure 5.1. Shipyard industry revenue comparison. 
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The choice of these companies and the use of their financial data for comparison 
purposes makes several assumptions. The first is that they are in a business that is similar 
to PHNSY & IMF AC. In fact, much of these private shipyards revenue comes from 
shipbuilding and not ship repair. For purposes of this thesis, those two operations, 
shipbuilding and ship repair, are assumed to be very similar in operations, cost, a.Tld asset 
investment. Secondly, the financial reports from PHNSY (Financial & Operating 
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Statement) are assumed to have an account structure similar to the private financial 
reports. The CFO Act of 1990 requires that federal financial reporting move towards the 
content and structure of the private sector. The point of this is to be able to compare, to 
some degree, the financial information of the public and private sector shipbuildinglship-
repair industry. 
B. THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
In applying this perspective to the PHNSY & IMF AC problem, financial data from 
the companies described above were used. For the public sector there are no market 
ratios since there is no stock outstanding. However, the other financial ratios, (liquidity, 
asset management, debt management, and profitability) can be used to evaluate the 
financial performance of a NSY. When compared to the same ratios within the private 
sector we get a picture not only of the health of the public shipyard but also a comparative 
standing of the public shipyard within the private shipyard industry as welL 
1996 Todd Halter Avomale NNS Average PHNSY 
Current ratio 3.47 2.38 2.16 1.92 2.48 (0.77) 
Days of inventory 6.24 11.13 14.64 9.49 10.37 35.08 
Total asset turnover 0.62 1.63 1.28 0.80 1.08 1.15 
1997 
Current ratio 2.11 Noda1a 2.66 1.28 2.02 0.82 
Days of inventory 5.14 Noda1a 15.74 9.29 10.06 31.81 
Total asset turnover 0.70 Noda1a 1.22 0.71 0.88 0.81 
Table 5.1. Financial Perspective Ratios showing PHNSY and the "Industry." 
Table 5.1 shows an example of the results of this type of analysis for the years 
1996 and 1997. While these calculations were performed with only PHNSY data, once 
NIMF data is input into SYMIS, composite ratios can be calculated. Recall from Chapter 
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ill that current ratio is current assets divided by current liabilities, inventory turnover is 
sales divided by inventory value, days of inventory is 365 divided by inventory turnover, 
and total asset turnover is sales divided by the sum of total assets plus accumulated 
depreciation. All of the financial ratios previously discussed were calculated and can be 
reviewed in Appendix D. However, since one of the goals of the BSC is to keep the 
number of performance measures to a minimum, three ratios have been chosen to define 
the financial perspective. They are current ratio, days of inventory, and total asset 
turnover. These were chosen because they emphasize liquidity and asset management and 
have the most applicability for comparison to the private sector. They reflect the invested 
capital in the organization that managers should employ to improve the rate of return. 
The debt management ratios were calculated but not considered because the debt 
and equity structure of a public agency is fundamentally different than in the private 
sector. Also, the profitability ratios were calculated but not used since the financial goal 
of a NSY is to break even (i.e., net income of zero). 
Table 5.1 shows the results of the financial analysis for each of the shipyards 
mentioned. As with any ratio analysis, the ratios in themselves mean little. They must be 
compared with other similar ratios to determine their importance. For example, inventory 
turnover implies 32 days of inventory at PHNSY compared with 9.3 days for NNS (in 
1997). Even though it is a non-manufacturing shipyard (i.e., no new construction), 
PHNSY has nearly three times the inventory on hand as the other shipyard. While the 
ratios may not be useful by themselves, when used as a basis for comparison, both in year-
to-year (trends) and with other organizations, they can be important tools in management's 
decision-making processes. 
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Another point to discuss regarding ratios is their difference from period to period. 
A business may make strategic decisions for the long-term health of the company that, in 
the short run, move a particular ratio in the "wrong" direction. Management must 
examine the underlying components of the ratio to determine exactly why it moved in a 
particular direction. For example, in 1996 PHNSY's current ratio was negative. This was 
because it had a significant negative cash flow in the amount of about $70 million that 
resulted in a negative value for current assets. 
1. Current Ratio 
Current ratio was chosen because it is an excellent measure of the ability of the 
business to cover its current liabilities. Management seeks to increase this ratio. For 
1996, PHNSY had a negative current ratio for the reasons discussed above. In 1997, the 
ratio was greater than zero, but well below the average. A current ratio as low as 
PHNSY's 1996 and 1997 values would be a source of concern in private industry. 
2. Days of Inventory 
Days of Inventory was chosen because it is an excellent measure of the amount of 
resources devoted to inventory. With the private sector's recent emphasis on Just-In-Time 
(TIT) inventory management, the number of days of inventory has been steadily 
decreasing. For comparison purposes, a true TIT inventory management system 
approaches 365 turns, or an average of 1 day of inventory on hand. For both 1996 and 
1997, PHNSY was significantly above the industry average. This indicates PHNSY has 
significantly more cash tied up in inventory than the private shipyards. PHNSY 
management might see this as an area to investigate to determine if reductions in inventory 
could be made. This would allow the flow of resources to other functions within the 
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shipyard that could be used to increase the value added to the customer's product (e.g., 
increased man-hours for habitability improvements). Inventory control was a driving 
factor in the transfer of much of the PHNSY supply function to FISC Pearl Harbor. That 
transfer alone should decrease the days of inventory. (Note that PSNSY carried 94 days 
of inventory in FY 1997!). 
3. Total Asset Turnover 
Total asset turnover measures the effectiveness of the organization's total assets in 
generating sales. The fewer assets needed to obtain a particular level of sales the better. 
The higher this ratio the better. For this calculation accumulated depreciation was added 
back to total assets. In this way the total extent of a shipyard's historical cost of property, 
plant, and equipment can be compared. If depreciation were not added back, then older 
shipyards could have a higher ratio simply because of the large amount of accumulated 
depreciation that had been generated over the years. This ratio will also be a good 
indicator of the infrastructure reduction efforts. As infrastructure is reduced (i.e., 
buildings are demolished or turned over to Pearl Harbor Naval Station), total assets will 
decrease. This will increase the ratio. Additionally, with increased attention to reducing 
inventory this ratio, as well as the days of inventory, will decrease. In 1996 and 1997, 
PHNSY was well within the "industry" average values. 
4. Production, Plant, and Equipment Ratio 
Another ratio that might be useful in measuring infrastructure reduction would be a 
property, plant, and equipment (PPE) ratio. The ratio would be the current year's PPE 
divided by the 1997 PPE for both organizations. Over time the ratio should decrease and 
then stabilize. As this ratio is for future use, no calculations have been made for it. 
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It is important to note that the financial ratios presented here were calculated using 
only PHNSY data. The NIMF financial data were not included. As described in Chapter 
ill, financial reporting for mission funded organizations is very different than for NWCF 
organizations. The mission-funded organizations utilize the STARS-FL system, which 
reports on fonns NC 2199 and NC 2171. The concepts of revenue, expense, and asset are 
not reported in a way that is easily decipherable. After the consolidation, the NIMF 
financial data will begin to flow into SYMIS. This will provide the NIMF with the same 
cost visibility the NSYs enjoy. This will also place the NIMF's accounting infonnation in a 
more useable fonnat in tenns of ratio analysis. The intent here is to demonstrate the 
concept and also to show that, at least for 1996 and 1997, PHNSY's "numbers" were well 
within private and public industry standards. 
In comparison, Table 5.2 shows the ratios for all four of the NSYs as well as the 
public sector average. Table 5.3 shows PHNSY ratios versus the private and public 
averages. 
1996 PHNSY PNSY NNSY PSNSY Average 
Current Ratio (0.77) 0.47 0.95 1.00 0.41 
Days ofInveotay 35.1 38.5 66.5 79.7 54.9 
Total Asset Turnover 1.15 0.69 0.% 0.87 0.92 
1997 
Current Ratio 0.82 2.15 0.91 1.10 1.25 
Days ofJnventory 31.8 91.3 7.0 94.0 56.0 
Total Asset Turnover 0.81 0.72 1.33 0.95 0.95 
Table 5.2. Financial ratios for the public shipyards. 
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1996 Private Average Public Average PHNSY 
Current Ratio 2.48 0.41 (0.77) 
Days of Inventory 10.4 54.9 35.1 
Total Asset Turnover 1.08 0.92 1.15 
1997 
Current Ratio 2.02 1.25 0.82 
Days of Inventory 10.1 56.0 31.8 
Total Asset Turnover 0.88 0.95 0.81 
Table 5.3. Private and Public financial ratio averages and PHNSY. 
Table 5.3 shows that, with the exception of the 1996 current ratio, PHNSY is 
operating close to the averages of the public sector shipyards. It is interesting to note the 
differences in the averages of the public and private sectors. The total asset turnover 
ratios are very close. This indicates that the capital asset structure required to achieve 
sales is approximately the same for the private and public shipyards. The variance in 
current ratios highlights the differences in cash management and the structure of the 
liabilities portion of the balance sheets of private and public organizations. Where the 
private firm will show short term debt, leases, and accrued expenses for current liabilities, 
the public firm shows mainly accrued expenses. That means the NSY requires less cash to 
cover current liabilities. The days of inventory numbers show a significant difference in 
the way inventory is managed in the private and public shipyards. Private shipyards are 
able to perform a very similar mission as the public shipyards with a lot less inventory. 
Though not an efficient use of resources, the higher than "average" inventory levels may 
be effective from a national strategic maintenance view point. The only way to find out is 
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to conduct a detailed value chain analysis of the inventory management process, including 
the supply value chain. 
C. THE CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE 
1. CSMP Backlog 
CSMP backlog is a good measure of the outcome performance of PHNSY & 
IMF AC. As discussed in the previous chapter, the consolidation should enable seamless 
transfers of personnel and equipment between I and D level maintenance projects. This 
should allow management to "level-load" the workforce. Resources will be shifted 
between the two levels of maintenance as necessary to promote their most efficient use. 
This should improve workload. 
One way to measure the increase in work output is by observing a decrease in 
backlogged work items in each ship's CSMP. In order for this metric to be an effective 
tool to measure PHNSY & IMF AC's work output, two important points must be made . 
. 
First, each CSMP must be thoroughly "scrubbed" to ensure that it is complete and 
accurate. As noted in Chapter II, each ship is responsible for maintaining its own CSMP. 
The ship's ISIC has a measure of responsibility in the CSMP as well, but it is primarily the 
ship that sets the standard of what is considered a "clean" CSMP. For "CSMP backlog" 
to be a useful measure, each ship and its ISIC must work closely together to ensure the 
CSMP is as accurate as possible. While any performance measuring system can be 
"gamed" to some extent, the CSMP is so highly regarded as the measure of a ship's 
material condition that most ships work very hard to keep it "clean." Of course, increased 
ISIC oversight is often effective at ensuring the system is not "gamed." 
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Second, consensus must be reached regarding what items in the CSMP will be 
measured. CSMPs contain the entire history of maintenance on the ship. This includes 
past problems as well as current problems. Obviously, we are only interested in the 
current issues, but which ones? The CSMP comprises jobs that are assigned to 
maintenance activities and those which are not. Each level of the Naval Ship Maintenance 
Program is represented: organizational, intermediate, and depot. Additionally, there may 
be work items that have been assigned to contractors (private or public). Aside from the 
responsible maintenance activity, each job is coded with a priority number (PRI) 
designating the importance of the job. Some are "safety of ship," "safety of systems," or 
simply "must fix" (the PRI-2 jobs); and some are "fix it when we can" (PRI-4 jobs). 
If the ship's CSMP has been managed properly there should be few depot-
designated jobs older than the last depot maintenance period. Additionally, there should 
be few intermediate-designated jobs older than the last I-level availability (there will be 
jobs deferred or unfinished from the last availability). The recommendation here is to 
measure the following items: 
• Intermediate level jobs that are older than ninety days (TA-2 >90 days). Since 
there are nominally ninety days between upkeeps, those jobs that are greater 
that ninety days old are either unassigned or deferred. Since, due to the 
consolidation and the ability to move the workforce to where the work is, there 
will be more maintenance time available from PHNSY & IMP AC, we should 
expect to see the numbers of these jobs decrease. 
• Depot level jobs input since the last SRA. Again, since more production time 
is available, let us put it to work on these jobs in a piecemeal fashion rather 
than waiting for the next depot availability. 
• Organizational level jobs which are greater than one hundred and twenty days 
old (TA-4 >120 days). Maintenance that the ship plans to perform should not 
take more than 120 days to complete. 
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In addition to providing the ship an opportunity to have the problem fixed by 
PHNSY & IMF AC, these measures also provide the ISIC and the ship with an indication 
of the "health" of the CSMP. While PHNSY & IMFAC may not fix all of the maintenance 
issues in the metric areas described above, at least the condition of each ship's CSMP will 
be visible. 
2. Guarantee Work Index 
This measure would track the number of man-hours expended by PHNSY & 
IMF AC production personnel to correct post-depot availability problems. During depot 
availabilities the ship and NSY management keep track of items which require further 
work. Even during post availability sea-trials, maintenance personnel are performing 
corrective maintenance on the ship. After sea trials, the ship, the ISIC, and the NSY come 
to an agreement on the remaining "guarantee" work that must be performed to formally 
complete the depot availability. This work normally occurs during a ninety-day guarantee 
work period that follows the end of the depot availability. 
Although the size and magnitude of the list varies from ship-to-ship, a metric 
which tracked the total mandays required to perform that guarantee work would be a 
useful measure of the quality of the maintenance performed during the depot availability. 
Additionally, by dividing the post-availability guarantee work mandays by the total 
mandays expended on the ship, a ratio could be developed that would be comparable on a 
ship-to-ship basis. The Guarantee Work Index (GWI) is, then, mandays expended during 
the guarantee period plus total mandays expended during the depot availability divided by 
the total mandays expended during the depot availability. If no guarantee work were 
performed the GWI would be "one." This would be the ideal to strive for. 
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D. THE INTERNAL BUSINESS PROCESS PERSPECTIVE 
This is a difficult area in which to develop performance measures. Performance 
measures for this perspective must be developed by workers and managers who are 
intimately involved in the process. Value chain analysis and process improvement are two 
techniques that can be employed to examine PHNSY & IMF AC's processes in detail. As 
stated above, the innovation process is often overlooked during analysis. Since the 
process of screening and accepting work, planning the jobs/availability, and ordering parts 
and material is often as long as the actual availability, much attention should be paid here. 
Previously, cycle time and rework were offered as two common metrics for this 
perspective. Used in conjunction with one another, they can provide insight regarding 
how improved cycle time is affecting the quality of work (as measured by rework). 
1. Cycle time 
This measures the time it takes to complete a process. It could measure the time 
to write and approve a work package, the time to order, receive and distribute material, or 
the time it takes to complete a particular job. The measures could be determined for both 
individual events as well as system aggregates, or entire availabilities. As with any 
measure, the data are not always easy to obtain. Value chain analysis can help break down 
the components of the processes so that individual parts of the whole can be measured. 
2. Rework 
Rework concerns itself with quality, but here it is not used as a customer 
satisfaction measure. Rather it is used to "grade" the internal workings of the process. If 
the innovation and operations processes are carried out properly, there should be no 
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rework. By tracking the rates at which rework occurs, management can get a "feel" for 
when the process is not working properly. Again, data may not be easily obtainable. 
E. THE LEARNING AND GROWTH PERSPECTIVE 
In this perspective PHNSY & IMF AC seek to answer the question: how do we 
learn and innovate to create the future? As described above, this perspective is usually 
defined using employee-related measures. 
1. Employee Satisfaction 
Employee satisfaction is normally measured with surveys. As DOD organizations, 
both PHNSY and NIMF conduct annual workforce surveys. These surveys evaluate the 
working climate by examining many different areas within the organization. To be 
effective, management must thoroughly analyze the results and make decisions or take 
action that increases employee satisfaction and adds value to the customer. 
2. Employee Retention 
Employee retention is a measure of employee satisfaction and the loss of 
intellectual capital that results when highly skilled workers leave the company. There 
should be measures at several different levels. This measure should be tracked for 
PHNSY & IMFAC as a whole and for each department/division. Benchmarking this area 
will be difficult. Private data are just not available. However, with consensus on the 
specific measure, each of the NSY s could provide numbers that senior management could 
then compare. The ratio itself should be rather simple: number of employees leaving the 
shipyard divided by the total number of employees at the shipyard. There would also be 
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measures for each department/division. For PHNSY & IMFAC these ratios should 
measure only the civilian workforce. 
3. Employee Productivity 
Several measures are currently in place at NIMF and PHNSY. However, there are 
no standards against which to measure performance. Productivity measures seek to 
detennine how much time is spent perfonning the required work versus the total time 
available to do work (the total capacity). In this area, there is a kind of benchmark against 
which to measure. OPNA VINST lOOO.16H (Manpower Requirements) defines the "Navy 
standard workweek." The definitions cover both active-duty Navy personnel and civilians 
employed by the Navy. Wartime, peacetime, sea-duty assignments, and shore-duty 
assignments are all discussed. Table 5.4 shows the composition of the Navy standard 
workweek for "Peacetime shore activities." It should be noted that both the active duty 
and civilian workers are expected by the eNO to "put in the same hours." 
OPNA VINST lOOO.16H 
Military (hours) Civilian (hours) 
Workweek 40.0 40.0 
Training 1.5 0.3 
Diversions 1.0 0.2 
Leave 2.6 4.6 
Holidays 1.5 1.5 
Total available work time 33.4 33.4 
% accepted capacity 83.5% 83.5% 
% accepted lost capacity 16.6% 16.6% 
Table 5.4. The composition of the standard Navy workweek [Ref. 32] 
Using this data, we may be able to detennine the work capacity of an organization. 
Table 5.4 shows the ideal number of productive working days a Navy shore based activity 
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can expect to obtain during peacetime. If an index could be obtained to compare to the 
ideal, we could measure the actual working capacity of the organization. While private 
sector data are not available, NSY data are. 
1997 PHNSY Portsmouth NSY Nonolk NSY Po t NSY Totals ~~~~~~~~ 
Worldoad (mandays) 353,000 515,000 1,117,000 1,420,000 3,405,000 
r-----~--~~--~--~_+------~~~----~~--
Total Ett1>loyees 2,680 3,335 6,944 9,085 22,044 ~~~~~~----+---~~------~~+-------~~ 
Days WOIked Ratio 131.7 154.4 160.9 156.3 154.5 
~~------------~----~----------~----------
Table 5.5. The days worked ratio and the four NSYs. [Data from NAVSEA] 
Table 5.5 shows the total workload (in mandays) charged and the total number of 
personnel at each of the NSYs in 1997. By dividing manday workload by people, the unit 
analysis yields "days." For example, if a job was planned to take 100 mandays and there 
were 10 men to work on it, the job should take 10 days. While this example is an 
oversimplification of a complex process, it does get the idea across. Table 5.5 shows that 
the four NSYs produced an average of 154.5 "days worked" in 1997. When compared to 
the ideal of218 days (365 days minus 104 weekend days times the 83.5% from Table 5.2), 
the actual capacity is 73.7%. The question is: why did the NSY s not work 218 days? The 
answer is simple; it shouldn't be equal to 218 days. The numerator is the total direct 
production time in mandays, while end strength is the total number of employees at the 
NSY. Not all of the employees at a NSY are direct production workers. Some employees 
perform indirect work and others are counted as overhead. Is the days-worked ratio 
(DWR) a misleading measure? This researcher believes it is an excellent indicator of the 
overall process health of a NSY. It provides a quick snapshot of all personnel resources 
required by a NSY to perform direct production work. While the ratio will never be equal 
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to 218 days, it can be compared to the other NSY s and it can be tracked over time to 
evaluate the trend. 
Where the "218 days" value may come in handy is in an analysis of the total work 
charged at the NSY and the total number of personnel that produced the work. For 
example, in 1997 the total straight time mandays worked by "productive" shops were 
206,142 [Ref 29]. That work was performed by approximately 950 people (averaged 
over the year) [Ref 29]. Calculating the DWR with these two numbers yields a value of 
217 days worked. While not exactly 218, it is close enough. One problem with this 
measure is that it may be just a validation of the time keeping process. All work must be 
charged to a direct or indirect JON, so it is probably no surprise that the ratio comes out 
close to 218. This line of reasoning could be applied to any area where time data and 
personnel data are available. 
It is interesting to note that the DWR is the lowest at PHNSY when compared to 
the other three NSY s. PHNSY is the smallest yard in terms of both personnel and 
production work. There is certainly a base level of overhead infrastructure and personnel 
that are required to operate a NSY. One could then make the argument that PHNSY 
should have a lower DWR. However, PHNSY is not that much smaller than Portsmouth 
NSY, yet the PHNSY DWR is 15% lower. This metric might be used to examine the 
reasons why the total population ofPHNSY produces less output mandays than the other 
NSYs. 
Another measure within this perspective is "revenue per employee." This is similar 
in concept to the currently proposed "cost per unit of output. " In both instances there is 
an attempt to show the relationship bet~een dollars and people, one in terms of dollars 
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earned and the other in terms of dollars spent. The first measure compares total revenue 
to total employees. That measure is a common ratio used to compare productivity 
between different companies. In general, the higher the ratio the more productive is the 
workforce. The second measure compares total cost to some unit of output. That unit is 
normally "labor hours worked." While that is a good measure that can be compared 
within the public sector, it is very hard to compare to the private sector. A more universal 
cost measure might be "cost per employee," using cost of goods/services sold. 
It must be remembered that the goal of the NSY is to minimize cost per employee 
not maximize revenue per employee. The private yards seek to meet both objectives 
simultaneously. That said, PHNSY revenues do not include the 3-5% profit margin the 
private shipyards include. That means the PHNSY revenue per employee value is actually 
understated. The advantage of the "revenue/cost per employee" metric is that there are a 
wealth of data available from private industry against which the NSY s can be compared. 
Table 5.6 shows the ratios for PHNSY and several of the private shipyards previously 
discussed. Table 5.7 shows the ratios using the public shipyards. PHNSY's "revenue per 
employee" is above the average for both 1996 and 1997 (that is good) while the "cost per 
employee" is higher in 1996 (bad) and lower in 1997 (good). However, even for the "bad" 
year in 1996, PHNSY's cost per employee is well within the range of values. The overall 
conclusion is that PHNSY appears to be at least as productive per employee and as cost 
effective per employee as the private shipyards. 
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Todd Halter Avondale NNS Average PHNSY 
1996 Revenue (K.$) 101,687 406,797 624,929 1,870,000 340,101 
Total Employees 1,100 4,300 5,600 17,937 2,922 
Revenue (K$) per Employee 92.4 94.6 111.6 104.3 100.7 116.4 
1996 Cost of goods/services 71,674 355,209 543,102 1,730,000 272,663 
Cost (K.$) per employee 65.2 82.6 97.0 96.4 85.3 93.3 
1997 Revenue (K.$) 114,398 670,200 613,993 1,707,000 326,153 
Total Employees 1,100 5,300 5,500 16,500 2,726 
Revenue (K$) per Employee 104.0 126.5 111.6 103.5 111.4 119.6 
1997 Cost of goods/services 93,982 589,500 538,515 1,729,000 244,261 
Cost (K.$) per employee 85.4 111.2 97.9 104.8 99.8 89.6 
Table 5.6. Revenue/Cost per Employee ratios for the Industry. 
PHNSY PNSY NNSY PSNSY Average 
1996 Revenue (K.$) 340,101 293,019 680,010 926,692 
Total Employees 2,922 3,686 6,944 9,478 
Revenue (K.$) per Employee 116.4 79.5 97.9 97.8 97.9 
1996 Cost of Goods/Services 272,663 221,056 502,274 686,272 
Cost (K.$) per Employee 93.3 60.0 72.3 72.4 74.5 
1997 Revenue (K$) 326,153 399,116 920,265 969,542 
Total Employees 2,726 3,388 6,944 9,140 
Revenue (K.$) per Employee 119.6 117.8 132.5 106.1 119.0 
1997 Cost of Goods/Services 244,261 179,955 675,443 711,794 
Cost (K$) per Employee 89.6 53.1 97.3 77.9 79.5 
Table 5.7. Revenue/Cost per employee ratios for the Public Shipyards. 
The Test Plan metric, cost per unit, is a ratio of the total cost of the organization 
to the number of direct production mandays worked. This ratio was discussed in Chapter 
ill. As a surrogate for productivity, it belongs in the "Learning and Growth Perspective. " 
A final measure that can be used to evaluate the consolidation is the 
deferred/rejected jobs ratio. This measure is more appropriately calculated for the I-level 
component of work at PHNSY & IMF AC. During intermediate maintenance periods, 
104 
some jobs are deferred to the next upkeep while others are rejected. This may occur for 
several reasons. If it is decided by I-level management that a job is not within the 
capability of the particular maintenance activity or the activity does not have the capacity 
to do the job within the allotted time, it is rejected from the work package. In other cases, 
a job may have been in planning or actually in progress when an issue developed which 
precluded the maintenance activity's ability to complete the job during the availability. 
These jobs are deferred to a voyage repair period or to the next I-level maintenance 
period. If the consolidation works as planned then, depending on the D-Ievel workload, 
capacity should be available to complete all of the jobs a ship requests. The numbers of 
deferred and rejected jobs in a ship's CSMP should decrease following the consolidation. 
As this is a measure that NIMF already tracks, it is easy to add to the list and it can 
provide another source offeedback regarding the success of the consolidation. 
F. POTENTIAL RESULTS OF THE CONSOLIDATION 
Based on this in depth review of PHNSY & IMF AC consolidation, one can't help 
but wonder whether or not productivity will actually increase. If it does, it will provide 
more "maintenance per dollar." That will reduce the cost per unit of production for the 
customers. The question is, how much of an increase in productivity can we expect? 
How much of a reduction in cost per unit production can we hope to see? While there 
will be no actual answers to these questions until FY 1999, the data provide several clues. 
The Pilot Transition Team Study Report [Ref 8] predicts an eighteen percent 
increase in "wrench-turners" (Code 900 production workers) and a twenty-three percent 
increase in the ratio of "workers" to "supervisors" as a result of the transfer of personnel 
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from indirect, overhead functions to direct production shops. As a result of these transfers 
the Pearl Harbor Pilot Test Plan [Ref 35] predicts: 
• A three to five percent reduction in cost per unit of production. This would 
equate to a decrease, using the five percent figure, from $784.21 in FY 1997 to 
$745.00 in FY 1999 (not adjusted for inflation). 
• A three to five percent reduction in the production efficiency and resource 
utilization ratio. Remember this is a measure of the total activity labor man-
hours charged per man-hour of direct production shop time. PHNSY & 
IMF AC are planning to increase the denominator of this ratio through 
improved workload management and an increase in the number of production 
workers. This level of reduction would equate to a decrease from 2.28 in FY 
1997 to 2.17 in FY 1999. 
• A seven to ten percent reduction in the total line items of CSMP backlog. 
Using the ten percent figure, this would equate to a "per ship backlog" 
decrease from 530 to 477 jobs for surface ships and 390 to 351 jobs for 
submarines over the period ofFY 1997 to FY 1999. 
G. SUMMARY 
The process of developing a strategic plan and the measures to evaluate the 
success or failure in achieving the goals and objectives of the plan is a challenging problem 
for senior leadership in our NSY s. It is vital that the process be undertaken to ensure 
goals and objectives are set and clearly understood by management, the workforce, and 
the stakeholders outside the direct boundaries of the organization. Once the goals are 
clearly defined, performance measures must be developed to allow all levels of the NSY 
the opportunity to gauge the extent to which the goals are being met. This chapter briefly 
described the framework of the process of developing performance measures. The 
example used in this thesis to describe the application of the framework is a Naval 
Shipyard. However, the process will work at any organization. In fact GPRA requires 
that the process be undertaken at all public agencies. 
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis has examined many aspects of the PHNSY & IMF AC consolidation in 
Pearl Harbor. In particular the performance measures selected to evaluate the efficacy of 
the consolidation were presented and discussed in detail. The five metrics proposed by 
NA VSEA and the NAS are very appropriate measures with which to evaluate the success 
of the PHNSY & IMF AC consolidation. They effectively represent two of the four 
perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. It must be remembered that one of the 
perspectives, the internal-business perspective was not considered an appropriate area for 
external concern. Therefore the only perspective not covered by the proposed metrics is 
the financial perspective. For that perspective, total asset turnover, a financial measure, 
would be an excellent measure to include. That ratio not only provides an evaluation of 
how well NSY resources are being used, it tracks inventory and infrastructure reductions 
as well. 
Figure 6.1 shows how the metrics recommended for PHNSY & IMF AC fit into the 
Balanced Scorecard. The measures shown in the figure and discussed in Chapter V are 
excellent measures for PHNSY & IMF AC senior management to track. Now the question 
is: what metrics should OSD and Congress review to measure the success of 





Guarantee Work Index 
Customer Surveys (Quality) 
Financial Perspective 
Current Ratio 
Inventory turnover (days) 





Innovation and Learning 
Perspective 
Revenue/Cost per employee 
Cost per Unit 
Production Efficiency Ratio 
Days Worked Ratio 
DeferredlRejected Jobs Ratio 
Internal Business Perspective 
Rework (first pass yield) 
Shipyard Cycle Effectiveness 
(cycle time) 
Figure 6.1. PHNSY & IMFAC and the Balanced Scorecard. 
1. The Customer Perspective 
• CSMP backlog should be a primary indicator of the success of the 
consolidation. As has been discussed in detail this measure should decrease as 
more production capability is generated as a result of the consolidation. Ag~ 
it is imperative that every effort be made to ensure the CSMPs are as accurate 
as possible. 
• Schedule adherence is important to both the ship and the Fleet commander for 
obvious reasons. It may not be obvious why it is also important to PHNSY & 
IMP AC. Depot and intermediate level availabilities are scheduled well into the 
future. If an availability runs longer than originally planned it affects the other 
availabilities that are already in progress or just starting. Production shops get 
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overloaded and all work slows down. This affects the other availabilities and 
they tend to run longer also, and the cycle continues. 
• The Test Plan intends to measure a "quality" metric through the use of 
customer satisfaction surveys. Surveys certainly have their place. It is 
important that the surveys ask the proper questions and that action is taken to 
address the concerns of the customers. If those two areas are not addressed 
the surveys will not be effective. 
2. The Financial Perspective 
Total asset turnover should be the measure OSD and Congress review in this 
perspective. It captures not only the relationship between revenue and total assets, but it 
will also track the efforts to reduce inventory and infrastructure. It therefore becomes a 
single measure that tracks how well the public's money is being utilized by PHNSY & 
IMFAC. 
3. The Internal Business Perspective 
For this perspective there are no specific metric recommendations for OSD and 
Congress. Both cycle-time and rework metrics would be very useful measures to track. 
As discussed, the development of those measures will be difficult. By focusing on one 
process, attention to another process might slip. Gains in one area might be made at the 
expense of other areas. However, this is a perspective in which some very important 
metrics could be developed that would be useful in measuring the success of· the 
consolidation. Both OSD and the Congress would probably be interested in knowing the 
effect on specific internal processes resulting from the consolidation. This is an important 
perspective for PHNSY & IMF AC to explore. 
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4. The Innovation and Learning Perspective 
• Cost per unit of production is a good measure. Again, this metric was placed 
in this perspective instead of the financial perspective because the metric is a 
surrogate productivity measure. The metric does not directly measure 
productivity, however, it does measure an area in which productivity gains are 
expected: namely, direct production man-hours. Additionally, it is a measure 
that PHNSY & IMF AC and NA VSEA are already tracking in some form or 
another. 
• The Days Worked Ratio (DWR) will be useful to compare to the other three 
NSY s. Currently the PHNSY DWR is quite a bit lower than the other NSY s. 
Hopefully the movement of personnel into the production shops and away 
from overhead activities will result in an increase in the DWR. 
• Revenue/Cost per employee is useful because it can be directly compared to 
private sector businesses in the same industry as the NSY s. It is also an 
excellent productivity measure that will work in concert with the other metrics 
in this perspective. 
• Production Efficiency is a metric that attempts to measure the capacity usage 
of PHNSY & IMF AC. This measure in conjunction with the DWR will 
provide an excellent picture of how productive PHNSY & IMF AC is, both in 
terms of internal capacity utilization and personnel resource utilization. 
As time and the consolidation progress, there will be other metrics to measure and 
track. The performance measures developed in this thesis are but a handful of the total 
number that could be used. However, in keeping with the BSC goal of reducing the 
number of metrics to track, fifteen were proposed. Of those, five had been previously 
proposed by Pearl Harbor Pilot Test Plan. Those five metrics were evaluated as excellent 
measures with which to judge the performance of PHNSY & IMF AC in FY 1999. 
Additionally, three other metrics, total asset turnover, the days worked ratio, and 
revenue/cost per employee were introduced. These three metrics "back-up" some of the 
other five metrics as well as capture other important aspects of the consolidation's 
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performance. As a package, the eight metrics are considered "strategically valuable" for 
review at the OSD and Congressional level. 
B. RECOMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Many areas are available for further study. Four have been selected and will be 
presented. 
1. The Financial Perspective 
A detailed financial comparison between the private and public shipyards would be 
very useful to decision-makers in NA VSEA. Currently there has not been a concerted 
effort to determine whether or not public shipyards are comparable to private shipyards. 
Additionally, a financial comparison between the four NSYs might also be useful. The 
proposed study should first examine the account structure differences between the public 
and private sector. 
a. The Balance Sheet 
The assets side of the balance sheet should be closely studied to ensure the 
assumptions made in this thesis are in fact valid. If they are, then the ratio analysis is also 
valid and direct comparisons can be made between the public and private shipyards. If the 
assumptions are not entirely valid, then the study should seek to determine if any 
corrections could be applied to allow direct comparison of the financial statements. On 
the other side of the balance sheet, the concepts of liability and equity (capital) are treated 
very differently. However some commonality may be found that would allow more areas 
of comparison between the private and public shipyards. The common areas would then 
facilitate more comparison. 
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b. The Income Statement 
As with the balance sheet, each portion of the income sheet should be 
examined to detennine how closely the account structure "lines-up." Most of the expense 
accounts shown on the income portion of the NSY's Financial & Operating Statement 
appear to match the private financial statements. Some of the revenue accounts, however, 
do not. How does that affect the comparison? Can adjustments be made to facilitate 
comparison? These are but a few of the questions that were raised during the course of 
this thesis. 
2. The Customer Perspective 
Several customer-related metrics have been presented and discussed in this thesis. 
One area that requires further analysis is the concept of "readiness." What is readiness? 
Can it be measured? How can it be measured? There has been previous research 
dedicated to this subject area. However no entirely satisfactory measures have resulted. 
TYCOMs and Fleet Commanders would like to know whether or not a ship is ready to go 
on deployment. Is the ship ready for combat? Can the ship carry out its mission? These 
are important questions. While there are some measures to fall back on (e.g., inspection 
results, training conducted), in the end, senior commanders make these decisions based on 
subjective measures. While there is nothing wrong with this, perhaps a few new objective 
measures can be developed to aid the decision making process. 
3. The Internal Business Perspective 
Previously it has been asserted that this perspective is the domain of internal 
managers. However, outside research into the different internal processes that make up a 
shipyard and a ship overhaul could provide insights that would be helpful to managers at 
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the shipyard. Value chain analysis and process analysis are two of the commonly used 
methods for this type of investigation. Ideas for specific areas to research could be 
provided by NASVEA or by one of the NSY s. 
4. The Innovation and Learning Perspective 
This would be an excellent area of study. Central questions would be: 
• What is the output of a NSY? 
• How can that output be measured? 
• What specific actions can be taken to sustain the ability of a NSY to change 
and improve? 
This perspective gets at the heart of productivity and improvement. Managers at 
all levels of the NSY s and at NA VSEA are vitally interested in improving shipyard 
efficiency and effectiveness. Any studies that shed light on potential areas of improvement 
would be well received. 
c. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The four perspectives presented in Chapter IV and V provide a slightly different 
view of NSY operations than has been presented before. In fact, in terms of financial 
performance, PHNSY is on equal footing with the four private shipyards that were used 
for comparison purposes. Public management is not like private management. If 
anything, managing a large public process like a NSY is much more difficult than in the 
private shipyard industry. In the private sector creating shareholder value is the bottom-
line. All efforts are aimed at that goal. The public sector is interested in creating 
stakeholder value although, in the past, that goal was not the priority. The GPRA has 
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rearranged the priorities of the public sector manager. They must now think in terms of 
stakeholder value, efficiency, and effectiveness in much the same way the private sector 
manager does. However, the measures that have traditionally been used in the private 
sector are not directly transferable to the public sector. The public sector manages to a 
budget; the private sector manages to the bottom-line. Fortunately there are several 
measures that tell a similar story in both sectors. 
If the forecasted improvements discussed in Chapter V occur, they would be 
impressive gains in performance for PHNSY & IMF AC. While only estimates of future 
improvements, they highlight the possibilities that I & D level consolidations can achieve. 
We must now wonder if the same possibilities can be achieved with consolidations at 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard & Trident Refit Facility and Norfolk. Naval Shipyard & 
Regional Maintenance Center. The next year will be a critical time for PHNSY & 
IMFAC. Not only must they streamline the consolidated organization, they must do it 
under the watchful gaze of a host of other parties who are very interested in the outcome. 
In FY 1999, the baseline will be compared to the FY 1999 numbers. If the numbers 
indicate the experiment has been successful, the Navy should certainly look to the other 
co-located I&D sites for further consolidations. 
In the end, if the Pilot is successful, the public as well as the Navy will be the 
winners. Improved maintenance effectiveness and efficiency will increase the readiness of 
our nation's warships, increase the Navy's ability to carry out its mission, and increase the 
public's "return on investment. " 
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3232 . UNDEL ORD/OUTOBL REIMB PROGRAM 
.00 1692911.42 
.00 ;;~~ ~~g~~ g:~~~r~~~M:M~N6~~.~:~NA ~.~~)j:\j:ri\0~~;r~~1~g1~g:H~:.·2~Tt~h- ~ ~ ;gg 
3280 DIR UNOBL RAL AVAIL eXPIRED ACC 
3310 ACCRUED EXPENDITURES - OIRCTPGM 
3320 ACCRUED EXPENSES • RE1MB PROGRAM 
TOTAL INVESTMENTS 
INCOME 
w_._w_~·_W .. __ ~._W~.~~_·~_·~~;~.~~~ 
4010 INCOME - AUTOMATIC 
4011 INCOME - AUTO INTRA APPN 
4012 INCOME - AUTO OTH OEF APPN 
TOTAL INCOME 
EXPENSES 
5010 COST WORK rOR OTHERS CURRENT YR 
5321 GEN EXPENSES - OTHER CURRENT VR 
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.::: :·;:00. ':····492322; 92 
:: .... .:.. ....... ~ ........ ~: ... :;~.~~.;...: .. ~ . .:;. .:. : ... ~ ~ ..... .:., ..................... : ... ... 
.. 06 5654GB75. B 1 
CRI:On 
662544.27 


















































I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNTS HEREIN REPORTED ARE IN ACCORDANce' WITH 31 USC 200 AND PRESCRIBED ACCOUNtINCj PRoct!tllJ~e.s. 
REPORTING SIGNATURE & TITLE/RANK DATE: 09/30/97 FISCAL 
OF'IC~R:~utH A. MATH!~ BY DIRECTION • __ w. ______ ... __ ~ _____ * __ ... __________________ ~ ___ · .... ~~.;.. ___ ..;..~~.-. .;..~--..;...".;~~.;...;..~-.;.. ... --- ... -------~ ... ----- ... ---- .... ---- ... --- ... ----------- ... --~---~------- .• 
'1 
LXR3417A 971804 70BB 39290 0 
LXR3417A TRIAL BALANCE CONTINUATION SHEET IN LIEU OF NAVCOMPT FORM 2199A FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
APPR: 17971804 SH: 70BB AAA 45924 08 HOLDER 39290 TO AAA OF 08 GRANTOR 45924 08 GRANTOR 00070 PAGE 4 
ACCOUNT NUMBER AND TITLE 
4 __ •• _~. __ ~ ____ ._~ ________ ~ ___ ~_ BAlANCeS'PR lOR, MONTH.,· .. · BALANCES CURRENT r.«lNTH CHANGES FOR MONTH 
... - .. ' .... ~.'" ............. ~ .... ,...:.: .;. .. ~:~~ .. ~.~ ~t· ~·:':'::~,>~::~t:~{ 
DEBIT DEalT CREDIT ------------------------------cR£i:lij DEBlT CREDIT 
MEMORANDUM/BUDGETARY 
--~---~-----.-------.-------~---
TOTAL MEMORANDUM/BUDGETA~Y ~~~- .. ~~-~~~--~ -~-.~~~---~--- ----------~---
.00 .00 .00 .00 














STAT I STICAL 
UNOB ANL BAL AVL-GP OTH THN MRP 
UNOB ANNUAL BAL AVAIL FOR MRP 
MRP GROSS AOv OBLIG 
ANNUAL LEAVE CONTINGENT.LIAB, 
EARNED & UNPAID SALARV & WAGES 
GROSS ADJ OBLIG TRAVEL OIR PGM 
GROSS ADJ OBLIG TRAV REIMB PGM 
GROSS ADv OBL~TRNSP THINGS."OIR 
GROSS ADJ OBlMTRNSPTHINGS~RMB 
GROSS ADJ OBL ADMIN TRAVELOIR 
AVIATION DLR GROSS AOJ OBllG 
GROSS ADv OBLIG-OBLIG AUTH 
GROSS ADJ DBLIG-AUTO REIMB PGM 
119876306.06 119876306.06 126670fl47. 50 ;;_· .... J_M'; __ M __ _ 
-....... ..;. ~ .. ~:..; .. ;;.. ~ ~:~.:.;;.;;;; .. ~ . ,.. ~ .;,. ...... ..,;; ~:~ ...; .. ~:~. ;;.;.;;.;;:~.: 
....... ...::- ...;·,.:· ... ·64 .;;:"':':~ .... :.: ...................... ~ ~ ..... .. 
.... ......... ..:. ......... - ........ 
4546113.66 .00 1031341.33 
. ".'00·· 'g·4932·.L30··,,·.,.··:· .00 
949321.30 .00 1030971. 22 
. :.::.: .. ,.: ... ,.:",,:()O, .. ,:·:··,·:·,,····,:,;··,·,···:·,,:·,):':(.\00· ..... : .. :·, ". :·2951275,.75 
iH:i3Eioi;Ol ··:'.06 1384504.48 
205396.52 .00 190881.01 • 
43850.10 .00 45377.77 














































TOTAL STATISTICAL 6816684f.73' ...94932{;\l072226169.70 19301l71.22 7457773.06 4100095.01 
.. "4 - .......... - .................. - ..... - ............... _ ...... _ ................................ ..:.. ...... ;.., • .;..: ~:",.:.- ........ :.t;; . .; ... :~ ...... ~ .. '""' .... .".:.:.:.;."':".-: ~.':t .... "" ........ __ ............................. ___ ............................. _ ......... _ ................ _ .. _ ........ _ ........ ___ ...... _ ................ ... 
.............. ".; ....... ,.;. - - .. ;,;;. . ..;;.;... ...... ";;:,,,,! •. ~ ...... ;;;.; ;.;. :;;.,:.,,;; :.;. ..... :;;.; ...... :: ..... :... .......... - ... .;,. - ......... - ... - - ...... - ...... - - - - ... - ...... 
CERTIFICATION: 
I CERTIFY THAT THE AMOUNTS HEREIN REPORTED ARE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH 31 USC 200 ANO PRESCRIBED ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES. 
~~PORTING SIGNATURE & TITLE/RANK DATE: 
FISCAL d9/30/97 
- ...... - ..;. - ... - - ......... - ... - - - .... - ... ,.;. ....... - ;.;. .;. .... _. ':'"' .;.0 .,.;..","!.~ ..... :_ .:;;:~ .;.0 -: - ';'-:~:.~:":",,. ",":.~. ~.~.:~:-::~:~ •• ~ ~:.~.~ .... :':o .. ~:.;.;;.:O;': ~ ;:;;;~::""'= ~ .. ;o;.-:.;;;.:-.:~ .... ..,; .... ~.~ ;".;.. ".; _ ... _._ ....... __ ... _______ ... ___ ...... _ ... ____ ... __ ......... __ ...... ___ ..... _ ... ___ ..... _ ... _ 
OFFICER:RUTH A. MATHER BY DIRECTION 
I I-lFriEBY CERTIFY AS OF THIS OATE 'THAT THE ATTACHED 30 SEPT 1997 
ACClJUNTING/FINANCTAL REPORTS H~ViLaEEN PROPERLVANti . 
CO~RECTLY PREPARED KEFLECTING ILL INFORMATION P~OViOE6 
At-:l) AI.L OTHER REQUIRED CATA REPORTED TO THE DEFENSE 
FINANCE ANti AcrOUNTING SERVICE. CLEVELAND CENTEP - PEARL HARBOR. 
REPORTING SIGNATURE & TITLE/RANK 
FISCAL 
OFFICER:RUTH A. MATHER BY DIRECTION 
.. - ....... - ... .- - - ......... , ........ -" T ........... J,.;. ...,; .............. 0!.1 ~ ~.:'"': '~. ~ ......... ~." ..... : . ...; ..... ..,:. ... -::~.f.~:::~::.\~·.""':'··~ . .,:.:.~::~ ~ .1+.+1: +.:. ~::~.~:..;.~ 1-+ ...... : ... ".:'"" ............. _ ............. _ ... i-P ............................. __ ........ _ .... _ ............. _ ...; _ .................... _ .. _ ""," ..... __ .... __ 
LXR2418A SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP/FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY/EXPENSE ELEMENT REPORT IN LIEU OF NAVCOMPT 2171 PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
FROM-DFAS HONOLULU OPLOC TO-CINCPACFLT OB APPROVED FOR-NAVIMFAC PEARL HARBOR HI 968607553 PEARL HARBOR HI 988807000 PEARL HARBOR, HI 968606500 
APPRO 971804 S/H 70BB 
CODE 








OB 39290 OCHARGEABLEUt~ 
EXPENSES 









FISCAL OFFICER RUTH A. MATHER 
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NAVAL INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY 
MRMS DATA FOR 1997 
OCTOBER 1997 - MAY 1997 ................................................................. 125 





NAVAL INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY 
MRMS DATA FOR 1997 
Oct-96 Nov-96 Dec-96 Jan-97 Feb-97 Mar-97 
Total Mhrs Assigned 219,826 181,271 196,377 196,340 178,435 199,438 
Gross Support Mhrs 58,608 47,752 54,496 56,400 51,579 58,616 
Gross Prod Mhrs 161,218 133,519 141,881 139,940 126,856 140,822 
Prod Mhrs deducts 49,540 44,769 52,064 44,171 33,893 35,926 
Net Prod Avail Mhrs 111,678 88,750 89,817 95,769 92,963 104,896 
Support Mhrs deducts 7,386 5,894 7,082 6,538 5,341 6,279 
Net Supp Avail Mhrs EX] 51,222 41,858 47,414 49,862 46,238 52,337 
Exp Prod Mhrs 98,111 87,792 81,313 91,278 86,483 99,968 
EamedMhrs 96,556 78,767 75,018 86,327 82,089 93,599 
Mhrs Unasgnd to JCN 8,052 6,216 5,537 4,359 3,922 3,809 
Lost Time Mhrs 2,383 2,665 3,481 3,511 4,445 3,719 
Unaccounted Time 4,687 1,102 5,781 1,572 2,507 3,769 
OT Mhrs Prod 632 742 425 505 896 508 
OT Mhrs Prod Supp 1,804 1,018 608 1,450 1,103 1,498 
MOEs 
Performance 0.865 0.888 0.835 0.901 0.883 0.892 
ExpendedlEamed 1.016 1.115 1.084 1.057 1.054 1.068 
Workload Performance 0.932 0.954 0.890 0.944 0.922 0.926 
OT Prod Ratio 0.64% 0.85% 0.52% 0.55% 1.04% 0.51% 
Utilization 0.693 0.665 0.633 0.684 0.733 0.745 
Gross Utilization 0.508 0.490 0.457 0.488 0.521 0.526 
ProductivitY 0.599 0.590 0.529 0.617 0.647 0.665 
Total Deduction % 25.9% 27.9% 30.1% 25.8% 22.0% 21.2% 
Load Ratio 0.928 0.930 0.938 0.954 0.958 0.964 
Performance=Eamed MhrslNet PAM 
Workload Performance=Eamed Mhrsl(Net PAM-Mhrs Unasgnd to JCN) 
Utilization=Net PAM/Gross PAM 



















































NAVAL INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACaITY 
MRMS DATA FOR 1997 
Jun-97 Jul-97 AU2-97 
Total Mhrs Assi2ned 186,727 181,340 188,406 
Gross Support Mhrs 54,670 47,926 42,682 
Gross Prod Mhrs 132,057 133,414 145,724 
Prod Mhrs deducts 47,494 44,966 47,873 
Net Prod Avail Mhrs 84,563 88,448 97,851 
Support Mhrs deducts 6,495 5,009 5,259 
Net Supp Avail Mhrs EX): 48,175 42,917 37,423 
Exp Prod Mhrs 79,032 80,092 89,391 
EarnedMhrs 87,433 81,352 98,178 
Mhrs Unasgnd to JCN 6,575 4,993 4,469 
Lost Time Mhrs 2,488 1,941 1,807 
Unaccounted Time (11,933) 162 (6,603) 
OTMhrsProd 330 254 1,398 
OT Mhrs Prod Supp 1,224 768 1,134 
MOEs 
Performance 1.034 0.920 1.003 
ExpendedlEarned 0.904 0.985 0.910 
Workload Performance 1.121 0.975 1.051 
OT Prod Ratio 0.42% 0.32% 1.56% 
Utilization 0.640 0.663 0.671 
Gross Utilization 0.453 0.488 0.519 
Productivity 0.662 0.610 0.674 
Total Deduction % 28.9% 27.6% 28.2% 
Load Ratio 0.922 0.944 0.954 
Productivity=Eamed Mhrs/Gross PAM 
Load Ratio=(Net PAM-Mhrs Unasgnd to JCN)/Net PAM 
Earned Mhrs=ETV 
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PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION 
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION PRES BUD 
LEDGER ACTUAL EOFY 
ACCTS ASSETS ($000) 
1110 CASH $ 36,522,611.15 6,559 
1120 a. COLLECTED OPERATIONS 344,295,334.91 
1131 b. COLLECTED CAPITAL ASSETS SURCHG 4,265,048.16 
1136 c. COLLECTED UNDISTRIBUTED DBOF 0.00 
1150 d. DISBURSED OPERATIONS (316,365,013.77) 
1160 e. DISBURSED CAPITAL ASSETS (3,416,513.95) 
1163 f. DISBURSED UNDISTRIBUTED DBOF 7,743,755.80 
1200 ADVANCESILOANS O.QO 
1300 ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 351,061.49 
1310 a. GOVERNMENT 155,800.29 
1320 b. OTHER ·0.00 
1321124 (1) COMMERCIAUEMPLOYEES 0.00 
1325 (2) MISCELLANEOUS 0.00 
1330 c. CREDITS PENDING-GOV'T SOURCES 195,261.20 
1390 d. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE-UNBILLED 0.00 
1391 (1) UNFUNDED COMMANDERS ORDERS 0.00 
1392 (2) COST OVERRUNS-GOVERNMENT 0.00 
1400 TOTAL INVENTORIES 21,285,231.76 
1410 a. WORK-IN-PROCESS 2,418,309.53 
1411 (1) IN-HOUSE /a! 11,763,183.46 
2410 (2) LESS PROGRESS PYMTS RECEIVED (9,344,873.93) 
1418 b. WlP - ACTIVITY RETENTION 3,288,073.51 
1420 c. MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES 14,199,530.10 
1421 (1) MATERIAL & SUPPLIES-ACTIVE 10,284,612.68 
1422 (2) MATERIAL & SUPPLIES-INSURANCE 1,979,458.61 
1423 (3) M&S-FORESEEABLE FUTURE REQMT 1,935,458.81 
1430 d. DIRECT MATERIAL 6,170,667.73 
2420 e. LESS PROGRESS PYMTS RECEIVED 0.00 
1460 f. ALLOWANCE FOR LOSS ON INVENTORY (4,940,930.68) 
1461 (1) ALLOW FOR MATERIAL&SUPPLIES (3,444,193.06) 
1462 (2) ALLOW FOR DIRECT MATERIAL (1,496,737.62) 
1490 g. MA TERIAL-IN-TRANSIT 149,581.57 
1491 (1) GOVERNMENT 149,581.57 
1492 (2) FROM CONTRACTOR'S PLANTS 0.00 
1493 (3) UNMATCHED 0.00 
1500 OTHER ASSETS 8,054,391.68 
1510 a. DEFERRED CHARGES 6,210,672.48 
1511 (1) MISCELLANEOUS 6,210,672.48 
1520 b. TRAVEL ADVANCES 409,987.04 
1540 c. UNALLOCATED COSTS (6,073,698.63) 
1541 (1) UNMATCHED 64,593.28 
1542 (2) UNMATCHED OTHER 1,608,286.88 
1543 (3) UNMATCHED REFUND/COLL (2,822.99) 
1545 (4) UNDISTRIB DISB-DBOF-SUMM REG (7,743,755.80) 
1546 (5) UNDISTRIB COLL-DBOF-SUMM REG 0.00 
1590 d. ASSETS UNDER DEVELOPMENT 7,507,430.79 
1592 (1) EQUIPMENT 4,942,068.55 
1594 (2) MINOR CONSTRUCTION 2,565,362.24 
1750 FIXED ASSETS 128,400,388.30 
1610120/30 a. CONTRIBINEW CONTRIBIPURCHASED 323,095,407.08 
1640/50/60 (1) LESS ACCUM DEPRECIATION (207,260,787.54) 
1670 b.NOTINUSE 0.00 
1680/90 c.OTHER 12,565,768.76 




PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
FIXED ASSETS ON THE 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION 
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
GENERAL PRES BUD 
LEDGER DESCRIPTION ACTUAL EOFY 
ACCTS ($000) 
1750 TOTAL FIXED ASSETS LESS ACCUM DEP $ 128,400,388.30 
1610 CONTRIBUTED FIXED ASSETS 323,095,407.08 
1611 LAND 69,067.00 
1612 BLOGS STRUCT&UTILllY 147,525,085.64 
1613 PLANT EQUIPMENT 147,566,939.92 
1614 PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 27,934,314.52 
1615 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1616 SOFlWARE 0.00 
1620 NEW CONTRIBUTED. FIXED ASSETS 0.00 
1621 LAND 0.00 
1622 BLDGS STRUCT&UTILI1Y 0.00 
1623 PLANT EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1624 PRODUCTION EQUIP 0.00 
1625 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1626 . SOFlWARE 0.00 
1630 PURCHASED FIXED ASSETS 0.00 
1632 BLOGS STRUCT&UTILI1Y 0.00 
1633 PLANT EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1634 PRODUCTION EQUIP 0.00 
1635 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1636 SOFlWARE 0.00 
1640 ACCUM DEP CONTRIBUTED FIXED ASSETS (207,260,787.54) 
1642 BLDGS STRUCT&UTILI1Y (107,459,861.54) 
1643 PLANT EQUIPMENT (82,032,126.00) 
1644 PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT (17,768,800.00) 
1645 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1646 SOFlWARE 0.00 
1650 ACCUM DEP NEW CONTR FIXED ASSETS 0.00 
1652 BLDGS STRUCT&UTILI1Y 0.00 
1653 PLANT EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1654 PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1655 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1656 SOFlWARE 0.00 
1660 ACCUM DEPRECIATION PURCHASES 0.00 
1662 BLDGS STRUCT&UTILllY 0.00 
1663 PLANT EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1664 PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1665 OTHER EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1666 SOFlWARE 0.00 
1670 NOT IN USE 0.00 
1680 EXPENSED FIXED ASSETS 0.00 
1682 BLOGSSTRUCT&UTILI1Y 0.00 
1683 PLANT EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1684 PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 0.00 
1690 PROPERlY AWAITING DISPOSAL 12,565,768.76 
130 
1b. 
PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION 
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
GENERAL 
LEDGER DESCRIPTION ACTUAL 
ACCTS 
LIABILITIES 
2100 ACCOUNTS PAYABLE $ 6,589,716.57 
2110 a. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 1,8n,372.16 
2140 b. HOLDBACK PROG BILL FROM CONTRACTOR 0.00 
2150 c.OTHER 4,712,344.41 
2151 (1) COMMERCIAL 4,712,344.41 
2152 (2) TRANSPORTATION REQUEST 0.00 
2153 (3) CAPITAL LEASES 0.00 
2154 (4) MISCELLANEOUS 0.00 
2160 d.INTEREST 0.00 
2170 e. UNFUNDED COSTS/SURCHARGES 0.00 
2200 ACCRUED EXPENSES 40,574,979.70 
2210 a. LEAVE 13,210,215.82 
2220 b. SALARIES AND WAGES-CIVILIAN 7,867,452.81 
2230 c. FRINGE BENEFITS 995,744.29 
2250 d. MILITARY LABOR 1,088,784.00 
2270 e.OTHER 17,412,782.78 
2300 ADVANCESILOANS 27,440,874.68 
2315 a. GOVERNMENT 27,010,531.14 
2313 (1) ADVANCE BILLING 23,432,030.60 
2314 (2) ADVANCES-REV RECOGNITION 3,578,500.54 
2320 b.OTHER 430,343.54 
2500 OTHER LIABILITIES 6,623,556.62 
2570 a. MISCELLANEOUS OTHER LIABILITIES 6,623,556.62 
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS 0.00 
TOTAL LIABILITIES $ 81,229,127.57 
TOTAL CAPITAL (EXHIBIT A-1) 113,384,556.81 
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL $ 194,613,684.38 
UNDELIVERED ORDERS 
9510 1. OBLIGATED TO GOVERNMENT $ 42,120,941.98 
9520 2. OBLIGATED TO PUBLIC 17,719,686.05 
9900 UNBILLED BAL OF CUSTOMER ORDERS $ 76,885,n8.53 
9460 /aJ CONTAINS UNBILLABLE W1P OF $ 1,332,020.21 
6021 SPONSOR FURNISHED MATERIAL $ 389,137.50 
6110 SPONSOR-OWNED EQUIPMENT - IN USE 4,190,000.00 
6130 ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (2,979,544.00) 
6300 UNFUNDED CONTRIBUTED CAPITAL (1,599,593.50) 
"I hereby certify that the amounts shown in this report are correct. All known transactions 
meeting the criteria of 31 U.S.C. 1501 (a) have been obligated and are so reported." 
2 0 OCT 1997 0.c;n':??/~-A DATE. _______ ,SIGNATURE:~::::_:'__:__::_:__:_:_:=_=_~·-~ - -__ - -_ ---.... ____ 








PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL FUND 
AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
GENERAL 
LEDGER AT PRIOR CURRENT INCEPTION 
ACCTS INCEPTION FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR TO DATE 
PRINCIPAL 
2910 CASH ALLOCATION $ 7,500,000.00 $ (7,500,000.00) $ 28,024,000.00 $ 28,024,000.00 
2921 DONATED MATERIAL & WORK-IN-PROCESS 320,821.00 1,093,164.32 607,219.59 2,021,204.91 
2922 CONTRIBUTED FIXED ASSETS 0.00 31,164,297.38 8,405,148.80 39,569,446.18 
2923 LIABILITIES ASSUMED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2924 ASSETS CAPITALIZED-PRIOR TO WCF 0.00 90,370,649.94 (292,713.16) 90,077,936.78 
2942 TRF-IN FROM OTHERS W/O REIMB-CAP-WCF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
..... 2951 TRF-OUT TO OTH W/O REIMB-GOVT AGENCIES 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 W N 2953 TRF-OUT TO OTH W/O REIMB-WCF 0.00 0.00 (2,118,652.82) (2,118,652.82) 
2954 TRF-OUT TO OTH W/O REIMB-CAP WCF 0.00 (42,787.93) 42,827.93 40.00 2961 NET TREASURY CASH-WCF 0.00 (82,075,697.05) 69,909,118.35 (12,166,578.70) 
!'J 2970 RESERVES 0.00 6,755,652.04 4,261,361.01 11,017,013.05 
2971 a. CAPITAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASES 0.00 (32,479.47) 32,479.47 0.00 
2972 b. MAJOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2973 c. MINOR CONSTRUCTION 0.00 36,166.62 (36,166.62) 0.00 
2974 d. CASH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2975 e. SOFTWARE SYSTEMS DEVELOP EFFORTS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2976 f.OTHER 0.00 6,751,964.89 4,265,048.16 11,017,013.05 
NET PRINCIPAL $ 7,820,821.00 $ 39,765,278.70 $ 108,838,309.70 $ 156,424,409.40 
2930 ACCUMULATED OPERATING RESULTS 0.00 (37,022,457.14) (6,017,395.45) (43,039,852.59) 
2932 a. OVER/UNDER APPLIED VARIANCE 3,953,416.16 
2934 b. RATE STAB VARIANCE ON CR ORDERS 139,058.15 
2935 c. COST OVERRUNS ON CR ORDERS 23,778.12 
2936 d. FIXED PRICE-RATE STAB VARIANCE (10,474,613.33) 
2937 e. FIXED PRICE-OTHER VARIANCE 2,133,778.59 
2933 f. EXTRAORDINARY CURRENT YEAR VARIANCE (1,792,813.14) 
2939 g. OTHER ADJUSTMENTS 0.00 



























































PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
STATEMENT OF REVENUE AND COSTS 
PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
DESCRIPTION 
REVENUE 
MANUFACTURING & ASSEMBLY 
CONSTRUCTION & CONVERSION 
OVERHAUL, REPAIR & RENOVATION 
ALTERATION & MODIFICATION 
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
SUPPORT OF SERVICE-WIDE SUPPLY 
SUPPORT OF TENANTS & SATELLITES 
ADDNS & IMPROVEMENTS TO PLTIEQ 
OTHER PRODUCTS & SERVICES 
REV FR DEPR-OTHER-SVCS PROVIDED. 
REV FR DEPR-MILCON-SVCS PROVIDED 





DIRECT COSTS INCURRED 
1. SALARIES & WAGES-CIVlLlAN 
2. MATERIALS, SUPPLIES & PARTS USED 
3. OTHER COSTS 
4. CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 
5. DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
6. TRANSFERS 
PRODUCTION EXPENSE 
1. SALARIES & WAGES-CIVILIAN 
2. MILITARY LABOR 
3. MATERIALS, SUPPLIES & PARTS USED 
4. OTHER COSTS 
5. CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 
6. DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
7. TRANSFERS 
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE 
1. SALARIES & WAGES-CIVILIAN 
2. MILITARY LABOR 
3. MATERIALS, SUPPLIES & PARTS USED 
4. OTHER COSTS 
5. CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 
6. DEPRECIATION EXPENSE 
8. TRANSFERS 
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED FOR PERIOD 
LESS COSTS OF MFG FOR ACTY RETENTION 
COSTS OF GOODS & SERVICES PRODUCED 
(INCREASE)IDECREASE IN WIP 
COSTS OF GOODS & SERVICES SOLD 
REVENUE LESS EXPENSES 
LESS SURCHARGES 
EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES 
COSTS FUNDED BY OTHERS 
1. DEPRECIATION-SPONSOR OWNED EQUIP 
2. MILITARY PERSONNEL 
3. MATERIAL 













































































































PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
ANALYSIS OF ACCUMULATED OPERATING RESULTS 
PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
GENERAL 
LEDGER DESCRIPTION ACTUAL 
ACCTS 
ACCUMULATED OPERATING RESULTS-
2931 BEGINNING OF PERIOD $. (37,022,457.14) 
APPLIED EXPENSES 
4810 PRODUCTION EXPENSE 98,584,115.17 
4820 GENERAL EXPENSE 63,749,463.13 


















PRODUCTION EXPENSE 89,393,381.08 
GENERAL EXPENSE 68,986,781.06 
TOTAL ACTUAL EXPENSES 158,380,162.14 
OVERI(UNDER) APPLIED EXPENSES 3,953,416.16 
BILLING VARIANCES 
COST REIMBURSABLE ORDERS 
RATE STABILIZATION VARIANCES fbI 139,058.15 
COST OVERRUNS 23,778.12 
COST REIMBURSABLE ORDERS VARIANCES 162,836.27 
FIXED PRICE ORDERS 
RATE STABILIZATION VARIANCES IbI (10,474,613.33) 
OTHER VARIANCES 2,133,778.59 
FIXED PRICE ORDERS VARIANCES (8,340,834.74) 
TOTAL BILLING VARIANCES (8,177,998.47) 
EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSE VARIANCE lei (1,792,813.14) 
OTHER ADJUSTMENTS 
PRIOR YEAR ADJUSTMENTS 0.00 
RESERVE BALANCING 0.00 




TOTAL OTHER ADJUSTMENTS 0.00 
ACCUMULATED OPERATING RESULTS-
END OF PERIOD $ (43,039,852.59) 
fbI Stabilized Variances adjusted for JLSC PY 1995/96197 surcharges billed of $624,573.83 
for cost reimbursable orders and $3,659,630.18 for fIXed price orders. 
lei Recorded write off to extraordinary expenses for stonn damage per NAVSEASYSCOM 


















PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD 
STATEMENT OF CASH SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS 
PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 1997 
EXHIBITC 
CASH ACCOUNT 
1. ACTIVITY CASH BALANCE - 30 SEPTEMBER 1996 $ (69,909,118.35) 
2. NON-REVENUE CASH CHANGES 0.00 
3. SOURCES OF OPERATING CASH 352,420,596.40 
a.REVENUE 
(1) FROM OPERATIONS $ 293,864,105.11 
(2) FROM SURCHARGES 32,289,048.16 
(3) FROM PASS THROUGHS, REFUNDS ETC. 0.00 
b. CHANGE IN ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 336,649.54 
c. CHANGE IN DEFERRED CHARGES 7,247,708.54 
d. CHANGE IN PROGRESS PAYMENTS 9,344,873.93 
e. CHANGE IN ADVANCES 9,338,211.12 
4. APPLICATIONS OF CASH (307,547,969.32) 
a. COSTS INCURRED FOR CUSTOMERS (309,031,120.21) 
b. DEPRECIATION 
(1) BUILDINGS, STRUCTURES 
AND UTILITY SYSTEMS 2,447,179.28 
(2) EQUIPMENT 8,099,096.00 
(3) OTHER 0.00 
c. PURCHASED CAPITAL ASSETS 
(1) MINOR CONSTRUCTION (435,161.87) 
(2) EQUIPMENT (2,981,352.08) 
(3) OTHER 0.00 
d. CHANGE IN INVENTORY 
(1) MATERIALS AND SUPPt:.JES 3,861,668.78 
(2) DIRECT MATERIAL 1,099,490.64 
(3) OTHER 66,498.40 
e. CHANGE IN OTHER ASSETS 2,394,713.69 
f. CHANGE IN ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 130,011.87 
g. CHANGE IN ACCRUED EXPENSES (9,094,661.10) 
h. CHANGE IN OTHER LIABILITIES (4,104,332.72) 
5. OTHER 61,559,102.42 
a. CHANGE IN GLA 2910129211292312924 28,338,506.43 
b. CHANGE IN GLA 2922 AND OTHER FIXED ASSETS (4,792,197.18) 
c. CHANGE IN GLA 2940150 TRF-INfOUT (2,075,824.89) 
d. CHANGE IN GLA 2961 NET TREASURY BAL-DBOF 69,909,118.35 
e. CHANGE IN GLA 297216 RESERVE-MM&RfOTHER 4,261,361.01 
f. OTHER ADJUSTMENTS, NET - GLA 2939 0.00 . 
g. SURCHGE!EXTRAORDNRY EXP - GLA 420014300 (34,081,861.30) 
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THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1996) 
1996 Todd 96 Halter 96 Avondale 96 NNS96 Private 
Income Statement K$ K$ K$ K$ Averages 
Sales 101,687 406,797 624,929 1,870,000 
Surcharges 
Cost of Goods/Services 71,674 355,209 543,102 1,730,000 
Gross Profit 30,013 51,588 81,827 140,000 
Operating Expense 28,996 21,361 45,037 
Other Income/( expense) 
Operating Income 1,017 30,227 36,790 140,000 
Other Income/( expense) 3,115 0 2,691 0 
Interest Expense 3 3,224 4,986 38,000 
Pretax Income 4,132 27,003 34,495 102,000 
Tax Expense 541 10,887 3,700 47,000 
Net Income 3,591 16,116 30,795 55,000 
Preferred Dividends 0 0 0 0 
Common Income 3,591 16,116 30,795 55,000 




Inventory 1,225 10,827 21,780 45,000 
Accts Rcvable 9,030 36,053 119,130 182,000 
Other 
Current Assets 68,706 147,677 222,490 491,000 
Long Term Assets 51,865 61,734 140,370 998,000 
Fixed Assets (net Deprec) 26,499 61,449 127,600 836,000 
Depreciation 44,000 40,000 127,000 861,000 





Current Liabilities 19,826 62,143 103,010 256,000 
Long Term Liabilities 33,365 53,967 78,000 1,001,000 
Total Liabilities 53,191 116,110 181,010 1,257,000 
Preferred Equity 0 0 0 0 
Common Equity/Capital 38,301 84,398 389,830 246,000 
Treasmy Stock (9,617) 0 (11,856) 0 
Retained Earnings! AOR 38,696 8,903 (196,120) (14,000) 
Total Equity 67,380 93,301 181,854 232,000 
Total Liabilities + Total Equity 120,571 209,411 362,864 1,489,000 
Number of Employees 1,100 4,500 5,600 17,937 
Revenue per Employee 92,443 90,399 111,594 104,254 99,673 
Cost per Employee 65,158 78,935 96,983 96,449 84,381 
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THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1996) 
1996 Todd 96 Halter 96 Avondale 96 NNS96 Average 
Common Shares Out 9,931,000 18,255,000 14,464,000 34,297,451 
Price per share $4.00 $15.00 $27.00 $27.00 18.25 
Market Capitalization $39,724 $273,825 $390,528 $926,031 
Tax Rate 13.1% 40.3% 10.7% 46.1% 27.6% 
Cost of Capital 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Liquidity Ratios 
Current ratio 3.47 2.38 2.16 1.92 2.48 
Quick ratio 3.40 2.20 1.95 1.74 2.32 
Asset Mngt Ratios 
Inventory Turnover 58.51 32.81 24.94 38.44 38.67 
Inventory to Current Assets 1.78% 7.33% 9.79% 9.16% 7.0% 
Days Inventory 6.24 11.13 14.64 9.49 10.37 
Days Sales Outstanding 31.97 31.91 68.63 35.04 41.88 
Fixed Asset Turnover 1.44 4.01 2.45 1.10 2.25 
Total Asset Turnover 0.62 1.63 1.28 0.80 1.08 
Debt Mngt Ratios 
Debt ratio (TLff A) 0.441 0.554 0.499 0.844 0.58 
Debt to Equity 0.789 1.244 0.995 5.418 2.11 
TIE ratio 
-
9.38 7.38 3.68 6.81 
Profitability Ratios 
Profit margin 3.5% 4.0% 4.9% 2.9% 3.8% 
Basic Earning Power 0.8% 14.4% 10.1% 9.4% 8.7% 
ROA 3.0% 7.7% 8.5% 3.7% 5.7% 
ROE 9.4% 19.1% 7.9% 22.4% 14.7% 
Market Value Ratios 
PIE ratio 11.06 16.99 12.68 16.84 14.39 
Book value per share $6.78 $5.11 $12.57 $6.76 7.81 
Market to book ratio 0.59 2.93 2.15 3.99 2.42 
140 
APPENDIXD 
THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1996) 
1996 PHNSY 96 PortsNSY96 NNSY96 PSNSY96 Public 
Income Statement K$ K$ K$ K$ Averages 
Sales 340,101 293,019 680,010 926,692 
Surcharges 0 0 0 
Cost of GoodsIServices 272,663 221,056 502,274 686,272 
Gross Profit 67,438 71,963 177,736 240,420 
Operating Expense 102,498 77,450 143,630 151,663 
Other Income/( expense) 
Operating Income (35,060) (5,487) 34,106 88,757 
Other Income/( expense) 0 0 0 0 
Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 
Pretax Income (35,060) (5,487) 34,106 88,757 
Tax Expense 0 0 0 0 
Net Income (35,060) (5,487) 34,106 88,757 
Preferred Dividends 
° 
0 0 0 
Common Income (35,060) (5,487) 34,106 88,757 
EPS 
Balance Sheet 
Cash (50,601) 119,256 140,811 
AdvancelLoans 0 0 107 
Inventory 26,204 23,337 91,452 149,780 
Accts Rcvable 688 21,722 (5,277) 11,103 
Other 41,890 31,705 58,959 
Current Assets (43,017) 36,348 237,136 360,760 
Long Term Assets 138,541 0 0 0 
Fixed Assets (net Deprec) 119,617 172,232 176,129 353,717 
Depreciation 200,789 217,059 291,960 353,197 
Total Assets 95,524 208,580 413,265 714,477 
Accounts Payable 8,697 15,447 28,893 
Accrued Expenses 36,273 112,979 170,379 I 
AdvancelLoans 31,777 118,770 146,703 
Other 1,251 2,522 13,285 
Current Liabilities 56,130 77,998 249,718 359,260 
Long Term Liabilities 28,830 0 0 
Total Liabilities 84,960 77,998 249,718 359,260 
Preferred Equity 0 0 0 0 
Common Equity/Capital 47,586 162,186 173,318 369,660 
Treasury Stock 0 0 0 0 
Retained Earnings! AOR (37,022) (31,603) (9,739) (14,470) 
Total Equity 10,564 130,583 163,579 355,190 
Total Liabilities + Total Equity 95,524 208,581 413,297 714,450 
Number of Employees 2,922 3,686 6,944 9,478 
Revenue per Employee 116,393 79,495 97,928 97,773 97,897 
Cost per Employee 93,314 59,972 72,332 72,407 74,506 
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THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1996) 
1996 PHNSY 96 PortsNSY96 NNSY96 PSNSY96 Average 
Common Shares Out - - - -
Price per share 
- - - -
Market Capitalization 
- - - -
Tax Rate 
Cost of Capital 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Liquidity Ratios 
Current ratio (0.77) 0.47 0.95 1.00 0.41 
Quick ratio (1.23) 0.17 0.58 0.59 0.03 
Asset Mngt Ratios 
Inventory Turnover 10.41 9.47 5.49 4.58 7.49 
Inventory to Current Assets -60.92% 64.20% 38.57% 41.52% 20.8% 
Days Inventory 35.08 38.53 66.46 79.66 54.93 
Days Sales Outstanding 0.73 26.69 (2.79) 4.31 7.23 
Fixed Asset Turnover 2.84 0.75 1.45 1.31 1.59 
Total Asset Turnover 1.15 0.69 0.96 0.87 0.92 
Debt Mngt Ratios 
Debt ratio (TUfA) 0.889 0.374 0.604 0.503 0.59 
Debt to Equity 8.042 0.597 1.527 1.011 2.79 
TIE ratio 
- - - -
Profitability Ratios 
Profit margin -10.3% -1.9% 5.0% 9.6% 0.6% 
Basic Earning Power -36.7% -2.6% 8.3% 12.4% -4.7% 
ROA -36.7% -2.6% 8.3% 12.4% -4.7% 
ROE -73.7% -3.4% 19.7% 24.0% -8.3% 
Market Value Ratios 
PIE ratio - - - -
Book value per share - - - -




THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1997) 
1997 Todd 97 Halter 97 Avondale 97 NNS97 Private 
Income Statement K$ K$ K$ K$ Averages 
Sales 114,398 670,200 613,993 1,707,000 
Surcharges 
Cost of Goods/Services 93,982 589,500 538,515 1,729,000 
Gross Profit 20,416 80,700 75,478 (22,000) 
Operating Expense 46,209 38,700 31,885 
Other Income/expense (2,800) 3,000 
Operating Income (25,793) 39,200 43,593 (19,000) 
Other Income/expense 4,858 (900) 3,294 0 
Interest Expense 27 6,600 4,804 55,000 
Pretax Income (20,962) 31,700 42,083 (74,000) 
Tax Expense 291 9,200 15,250 26,000 
Net Income (21,253) 22,500 26,833 (48,000) 
Preferred Dividends 0 0 0 
Common Income (21,253) 22,500 26,833 (48,000) 




Inventory 1,323 23,226 44,000 
Accts Rcvable 6,397 101,746 136,000 
Other 
Current -Assets 63,157 232,868 455,000 
Long Term Assets 52,632 142,747 1,021,000 
Fixed Assets 24,477 130,056 816,000 
Depreciation 48,000 127,000 926,000 





Current Liabilities 29,912 87,644 356,000 
Long Term Liabilities 37,937 78,994 937,000 
Total Liabilities 67,849 166,638 1,293,000 
Preferred Equity 0 0 0 
Common Equity/Capital 38,301 390,129 257,000 
Treasury Stock (9,617) (11,856) (2,000) 
Retained Earnings! AOR 19,256 (169,296) (72,000) 
Total Equity 47,940 208,977 183,000 
rotal Liabilities + Total Equity 115,789 375,615 1,476,000 
Number of Employees 1100 5,300 5500 16500 
Revenue per Employee 103,998 126,453 111,635 103,455 111,385 
Cost per Employee 85,438 111,226 97,912 104,788 99,841 
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THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1997) 
1997 Todd 97 Halter 97 Avondale 97 NNS97 Average 
Common Shares Out 9,910,180 28,100,000 14,491,000 34,741,818 
Price per share $5.00 $25.00 $27.00 $19.00 
Market Capitalization $49,551 $362,275 $938,029 
Ta.xRate -1.4% 36.2% -35.1% -0.1% 
Liquidity Ratios 
Current ratio 2.11 2.66 1.28 2.02 
Quick ratio 2.07 2.39 1.15 1.87 
Asset Mngt Ratios 
Inventory Turnover 71.04 23.19 39.30 44.51 
Days Inventory 5.14 15.74 9.29 10.06 
Inventory to Current Assets 2.09% 9.97% 9.67% 0.07 
Days Sales Outstanding 20.13 59.66 28.68 36.16 
Fixed Asset Turnover 1.58 2.39 0.98 1.65 
Total Asset Turnover 0.70 1.22 0.71 0.88 
Debt Mngt Ratios 
Debt ratio (fUf A) 0.59 0.44 0.88 0.64 
Debt to Equity 1.42 0.80 7.07 3.09 
TIE ratio - 9.07 (0.35) 4.36 
Prorrtability Ratios 
Profit margin -18.6% 4.4% -2.8% -5.7% 
Basic Earning Power -22.3% 11.6% -1.3% -4.0% 
ROA -18.4% 7.1% -3.3% -4.8% 
ROE -55.5% 6.9% -18.7% -22.4% 
Market Value Ratios 
PIE ratio (2.33) 13.50 (19.54) (2.8) 
Book value per share $4.84 $14.42 $5.27 $8.18 
Market to book ratio 1.03 1.73 5.13 2.63 
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THE FINANCIAL RA nos (1997) 
1997 PHNSY 97 PNSY97 NNSY97 PSNSY97 Public 
Income Statement K$ K$ K$ K$ Averages 
Sales 326,153 399,116 920,265 969,542 
Surcharges 0 0 134,985 
Costs of Goods/Services 244,261 179,955 675,443 711,794 
Gross Profit 81,892 219,161 244,822 257,748 
Operating Expense 53,828 150,200 143,746 78,748 
Other Income/expense 
Operating Income 28,064 68,961 101,076 179,000 
Other Income/expense (1,793) 0 0 0 
Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 
Pretax Income 26,271 68,961 101,076 179,000 
Tax Expense 0 0 0 0 
Net Income 26,271 68,961 101,076 179,000 
Preferred Dividends 0 0 0 0 
Common Income 26,271 68,961 101,076 179,000 
EPS 
- - - -
Balance Sheet 
Cash 36,523 57,116 64,250 (18,l30) 
AdvancelLoans 0 0 0 58 
Inventory 21,285 45,024 12,859 183,373 
Accts Rcvable 351 103,864 2,386 20,142 
Other 8,054 (49,531) 136,957 106,345 
Current Assets 66,213 156,473 216,452 291,788 
Long Term Assets 0 0 0 0 
Fixed Assets 128,400 168,655 184,255 358,878 
Depreciation 207,267 231,527 289,781 369,063 
Total Assets 194,6l3 325,128 400,707 650,666 
Accounts Payable 6,590 9,633 24,157 11,944 
Accured Expenses 40,575 42,735 l32,323 108,381 
AdvanceslLoans 27,441 20,406 76,388 137,875 
Other 6,624 - 3,693 7,104 
Current Liabilities 81,230 72,774 236,561 265,304 
Long Term Liabilities 0 0 0 0 
Total Liabilities 81,230 72,774 236,561 265,304 
Preferred Equity 0 0 0 0 
Common Equity/Capital 156,424 291,956 197,409 367,423 
Treasury Stock 0 0 0 
° Retained Earnings! AOR (43,040) (41,592) (38,016) 17,940 
Total Equity 1l3,384 250,364 159,393 385,363 
Total Liabilities + Total Equity 194,614 323,l38 395,954 650,667 
Number of Employees 2,726 3,388 6,944 9,140 
Revenue per Employee 119,645 117,803 l32,527 106,077 119,0l3 
Cost per Employee 89,604 53,115 97,270 77,877 79,467 
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THE FINANCIAL RATIOS (1997) 
1997 PHNSY 97 PNSY97 NNSY97 PSNSY97 Average 
Common Shares Out 
- - - -
Price per share 
- - - -
Market Capitalization 
- - - -
Tax Rate 
Liquidity Ratios 
Current ratio 0.82 2.15 0.91 1.10 1.25 
Quick ratio 0.55 1.53 0.86 0.41 0.84 
Asset Mngt Ratios 
Inventory Turnover 11.48 4.00 52.53 3.88 17.97 
Days Inventory 31.81 91.32 6.95 94.03 56.03 
Inventory to Current Assets 32.15% 28.77% 5.94% 62.84% 32.43% 
DaysSruesOu~rung 0.39 93.68 0.93 7.48 25.62 
Fixed Asset Turnover 0.97 1.00 1.94 1.33 1.31 
ToW Asset Turnover 0.81 0.72 1.33 0.95 0.95 
Debt Mogt Ratios 
Debt ratio (1LfT A) 0.42 0.22 0.59 0.41 0.41 
Debt to Equity 0.72 0.29 1.48 0.69 0.79 
TIE ratio 
- - - -
Profitability Ratios 
. Profit margin 8.1% 17.3% 11.0% 18.5% 13.7% 
Basic Earning Power 14.4% 21.2% 25.2% 27.5% 22.1% 
ROA 13.5% 21.2% 25.2% 27.5% 21.9% 
ROE 16.8% 23.6% 51.2% 48.7% 35.1% 
Market Value Ratios 
PIE ratio 
- - - -
Book vruue per share 
- - - -
Market to book ratio 











































LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Maintenance and Material Management 
Automatic Data Processing 
Allowance Equipment List 
Authorized Manning Document 
Accumulated Operating Result 
Allowance Parts List 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & 
Comptroller) 
Assist Work Center 
Automated Work Request 
Baseline Advanced Industrial Management 
Balanced Scorecard 
Chief Executive Officer 
Chief Financial Officer 
Controlled Industrial Area 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Concept of Operations 
A financial tracking application 
Commander -in-Chief Pacific Fleet 
Consolidated Ship's Maintenance Project 
Commander, Submarine Forces Pacific 
Defense Business Operations Fund 
Depot Modernization Period 
Department of Defense 
Days Worked Ratio 
Electric Boat 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
Earnings Per Share 
Engineering Time Estimate 
Engineering Time Value 
Economic Value Added 
Financial and Operating 
Fleet Industrial Supply Center 
Fleet Maintenance Activity 
Fleet Maintenance Pilot 
Fleet Modernization Program 
Fitting Out Availability 
Fiscal Year 
Government Accounting Office 
















































Guarantee Work Index 
Intennediate and Depot level of maintenance 
Internal Control Practice 
Intennediate Maintenance Activity 
Intennediate Maintenance Activity 
Immediate Superior In Command 
Job Control Number 
Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual 
Just-In-Time 
Job Material List 
Job Order 
Job Order Number 
Lead Work Center 
Material ordering And Tracking 
Manufacturing Cycle Effectiveness 
Maintenance Data System 
Commander, Naval Surface Group Mid-Pacific 
Miscellaneous Industrial Management System 
Management Infonnation System 
Measure of Effectiveness 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Material Requirement 
Maintenance Reporting Management System 
Market Value Added 
Naval Audit Service 
National Steel & Shipbuilding Company 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Navy Comptroller 
Naval Industrial Fund Reporting System 
Naval Intennediate Maintenance Facility 
Newport News Shipbuilding 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
Net Operating Result 
National Perfonnance Review 
Naval Ship Maintenance Program 
Naval Submarine Support Facility 
Naval Shipyard 
Navy Working Capital Fund 
Office of Management and Budget 
Operations and Maintenance, Navy . 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Occupational Safety and Health 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
Productive Man-hours 














































Program Budget Decision 
Project Control Work Load Forecast 
Pearl Harbor 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard & Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
Phased Maintenance Availability 
Performance, Monitoring, and Control 
Performance Measurement System 
Planned Maintenance system 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Property, Plant, and Equipment 
Pre-planned Jobs 
Priority 
Post Shakedown Availability 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 
Project Scheduling and Sequencing 
Pilot Transition Team 
Quality Assurance 
Quadrennial Defense Review 
Quality Management Board 
Restricted Availability 
Reduction-In-F orce 
Regional Maintenance Plan 
Repair Officer 
Resources 
A budget execution and overhead accounting application 
Ship Conversion, Navy 
Ship Depot Maintenance 
Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center 
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
Selected Restricted Availability 
Selected Restricted Availability 
Standard Accounting and Reporting System-Fleet Level 
Submarine Base 
Supervisor Desk 
Shipyard Management Information System 
Type Availability 
Technical Availability 
Task Group Instruction 
Total Quality Leadership 
Trident Refit Facility 
Type Commander 











Working Capital Fund 
Wage grade Worker 
Work Definition Conference 
Wage grade Worker 
Wage grade Worker 
Wage grade Worker 
Wage grade Supervisor 
Wage grade Worker 
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